Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sat down with David Gregory on Meet the Press to discuss the current state of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Netanyahu forcefully explained why Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's bid for unilateral statehood at the UN is untenable. He offered that the only way to a secure and viable peace, consisting of two independent states, was through direct negotiations.
Showing posts with label Middle East. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Middle East. Show all posts
Sunday, September 25, 2011
Friday, September 23, 2011
Obama Turns to the Rabbis
President Obama is starting to worry about the growing divide between the administration and American Jews, a normally solid constituency in the Democratic base. Last week's special election in NY represented the most recent signal of the Jewish voter's distaste with Obama's administration.
According to recent Gallup poll numbers, 40% of Jews disapprove of Obama, while only 55% approve of the president. This represents a sharp falloff from historical numbers. Obama received 78% of the Jewish vote in the 2008 election.
Aside from general economic concerns, much of this decline in support is due to Obama's lackluster policies in the Middle East. His attempts to push an Arab-Israeli peace have unsurprisingly backfired. His two major sins—pushing Israeli PM Netanyahu on settlements and demanding an agreement based on the 1967 borders—have greatly angered many Jews. These policies have led to stalemate, as they forced both Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to become locked into non-negotiable positions.
Obama's naive meddling has led to the most recent disaster today at the UN—a unilateral call for statehood by the Palestinians. Not only has this dealt a blow to the possibility of peace, but it has put Obama in an untenable position. If, as expected, this petition goes to vote in the Security Council this coming Monday, the United States will use its veto, undermining Obama's futile attempts to reach out to the Arab world. The administration's poor foresight has boxed them into a horrible corner, leaving them with little saving grace in the eyes of the international community. Somehow Obama has managed to anger everyone on all sides of the issue.
While there is little to be done about the international community at this point, Obama is apparently desperate to shore up the Jewish vote—a key constituency in what is an increasingly uphill battle for reelection. Obama has directly reached out to a wide community of rabbis, attempting to garner Jewish support by sprinkling High Holiday[1] sermons with administration talking-points:
Note:
[1] The Jewish High Holidays, Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year) and Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) will occur over the next two and a half weeks.
According to recent Gallup poll numbers, 40% of Jews disapprove of Obama, while only 55% approve of the president. This represents a sharp falloff from historical numbers. Obama received 78% of the Jewish vote in the 2008 election.
Aside from general economic concerns, much of this decline in support is due to Obama's lackluster policies in the Middle East. His attempts to push an Arab-Israeli peace have unsurprisingly backfired. His two major sins—pushing Israeli PM Netanyahu on settlements and demanding an agreement based on the 1967 borders—have greatly angered many Jews. These policies have led to stalemate, as they forced both Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to become locked into non-negotiable positions.
Obama's naive meddling has led to the most recent disaster today at the UN—a unilateral call for statehood by the Palestinians. Not only has this dealt a blow to the possibility of peace, but it has put Obama in an untenable position. If, as expected, this petition goes to vote in the Security Council this coming Monday, the United States will use its veto, undermining Obama's futile attempts to reach out to the Arab world. The administration's poor foresight has boxed them into a horrible corner, leaving them with little saving grace in the eyes of the international community. Somehow Obama has managed to anger everyone on all sides of the issue.
While there is little to be done about the international community at this point, Obama is apparently desperate to shore up the Jewish vote—a key constituency in what is an increasingly uphill battle for reelection. Obama has directly reached out to a wide community of rabbis, attempting to garner Jewish support by sprinkling High Holiday[1] sermons with administration talking-points:
...[T]he Obama administration on Thursday convened a conference call with several hundred rabbis and Jewish leaders. According to a participant on the call, President Obama promoted his jobs bill—noting that those who have been more blessed should pay their fair share—and briefed the rabbis on U.S. efforts to counter the push for a declaration of Palestinian statehood at the United Nations.Phone calls with religious leaders is apparently a regular event, but one that has increasing importance as the president gears up for the 2012 election. The administration is clearly on the defensive, sending out Democratic National Chairwoman Debbie Wasserman Schultz (a Jew), to assure pundits that Obama has firmly maintained the Jewish vote. Wasserman Schultz rejected any indication of trouble with the Jewish vote, stating:
That is absolutely not the case, and it will be demonstrated in the election next year that the natural home for Jewish voters, both domestically in terms of policy and in our Israel policy, is the Democratic Party and President Obama as our candidate.Wasserman Schultz must either live in la-la land, oblivious to the poll numbers, or simply be hoping that if she states the illogical enough it will become true. Unfortunately for Obama, it is unlikely that simple rhetoric will help his waning support among Jews—or other demographics, for that matter. If Obama wants to win reelection he has to change his strategy: cut out the meaningless speeches and actually show some good policy. The administration needs to turn around the economy and straighten out foreign policy, not beseech rabbis to indoctrinate their congregations.
Note:
[1] The Jewish High Holidays, Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year) and Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement) will occur over the next two and a half weeks.
Wednesday, September 14, 2011
A Rebuke Against Obama
One of America's most Democratic congressional seats has gone red. NY-09, the district once held by former Congressman Anthony Weiner, was won last night by Republican Bob Turner in a special election to replace the disgraced former congressman. The loss of this long-held district is a huge blow to the Obama administration.
The Democratic pedigree of the district is astounding and the statistics say it all. The district, currently a bastion of (mostly Orthodox) Jews and Catholics nestled in Queens and Brooklyn, has been held by Democrats since 1923. It has produced such notables as Chuck Schumer (current senator from New York) and Geraldine Ferraro (vice presidential candidate for Walter Mondale). Only two Republicans have held the seat since 1874 (for a total of six years) and over the entire history of the United States, Republicans have represented the district for approximately nine years.
Yet even if the statistics are insufficient to convince naysayers of the impact, local Democrats concede the results are a clear rebuke of Obama. For instance, Democratic analyst Hank Sheinkopf said:
Dan Senor, in the Wall Street Journal, details a laundry lists of administration affronts to Israel, but sums up the meaning of the vote rather succinctly.
And yet despite this wealth of evidence, many Democrats have tried to disavow any linkages to the administration's policy. This is foolish. Democrats can choose to ignore the lesson, but the interpretation of the special election as a rebuke against Obama stands rather solidly. Even Turner acknowledged that there was little daylight between his and former opponent's, Democrat David Weprin, positions, particularly regarding Israel. The voters, he argued, were not so much voting for him as sending a message of discontent to Washington. Hopefully, for Obama's sake and the country's, the message does not fall on deaf ears.
The Democratic pedigree of the district is astounding and the statistics say it all. The district, currently a bastion of (mostly Orthodox) Jews and Catholics nestled in Queens and Brooklyn, has been held by Democrats since 1923. It has produced such notables as Chuck Schumer (current senator from New York) and Geraldine Ferraro (vice presidential candidate for Walter Mondale). Only two Republicans have held the seat since 1874 (for a total of six years) and over the entire history of the United States, Republicans have represented the district for approximately nine years.
Yet even if the statistics are insufficient to convince naysayers of the impact, local Democrats concede the results are a clear rebuke of Obama. For instance, Democratic analyst Hank Sheinkopf said:
The Democrats said no to Obama, no to his economic plan, and no to his position on Israel.... It’s major smack at Democrats, a definite rejection of President Obama and it’s a warning that says if Catholics in the most blue of blue states can vote for the Republican they can do it in other states as well and the Democrats may have real trouble.But while Sheinkopf is correct to focus on the Catholic vote, Obama should also worry about the second major demographic that makes up NY-09: the Jewish vote. New York Democratic leader Ed Koch outwardly supported Turner's campaign as a message against Obama's approach to the Middle East. Many Jews, a large Democratic staple, have become increasingly frustrated with Obama's caustic policies towards Israel and have turned against the administration. This vote is a major indicator of that trend.
Dan Senor, in the Wall Street Journal, details a laundry lists of administration affronts to Israel, but sums up the meaning of the vote rather succinctly.
A Public Policy Poll taken days before the election found a plurality of voters saying that Israel was "very important" in determining their votes. Among those voters, Republican candidate Robert Turner was winning by a 71-22 margin. Only 22% of Jewish voters approved of President Obama's handling of Israel.This trend, should it continue, does not bode well for the president and will certainly aid the Republicans come 2012. Obama is getting hit hard in the supposedly safe bastions. His mismanagement of the economy, poor foreign policy, and general inability to manage the political climate in Washington, have alienated many of his traditional voters.
And yet despite this wealth of evidence, many Democrats have tried to disavow any linkages to the administration's policy. This is foolish. Democrats can choose to ignore the lesson, but the interpretation of the special election as a rebuke against Obama stands rather solidly. Even Turner acknowledged that there was little daylight between his and former opponent's, Democrat David Weprin, positions, particularly regarding Israel. The voters, he argued, were not so much voting for him as sending a message of discontent to Washington. Hopefully, for Obama's sake and the country's, the message does not fall on deaf ears.
Saturday, September 10, 2011
Egypt's Protesters Destroying Peace with Israel
Egyptian protesters are squandering their newly found independence as they turn to violence instead of peacefully trying to build a free democracy. On Friday, protesters attacked the Israeli embassy, tearing down a concrete wall and looting the building.
Israeli quickly had to evacuate their personnel, except for the deputy ambassador. According to reports, police did little to stop the rioting, although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu credits the Egyptian authorities with assisting in the evacuation of Israeli citizens. Netanyahu was quoted saying:
The Egyptian street should be very careful to avoid turning their rage towards the Israeli government, while the Egyptian authorities should do everything in their power to quell such rioting and destructive behavior. It is in everyone's interest to maintain a robust peace between the two neighboring states. No one, save the fundamentalist Islamists, will benefit from renewed strife between Egypt and Israel.
While it is unlikely for the relationship to quickly terminate in the near future, this is the second major instance in a month where Egypt's new government has failed to prevent attacks directed at Israel. This is a worrisome trend, demonstrating not only that the Egyptians do not fully control their territory but also putting unnecessary strain between two of the region's most powerful states. Peace between Egypt and Israel is essential for continued stability in the Middle East.
Israeli quickly had to evacuate their personnel, except for the deputy ambassador. According to reports, police did little to stop the rioting, although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu credits the Egyptian authorities with assisting in the evacuation of Israeli citizens. Netanyahu was quoted saying:
The fact that the Egyptian authorities acted with determination and rescued our people should be noted and we extend them our thanks.... However, Egypt must not ignore the severe injury to the fabric of peace with Israel and such a blatant violation of international norms.
The Egyptian street should be very careful to avoid turning their rage towards the Israeli government, while the Egyptian authorities should do everything in their power to quell such rioting and destructive behavior. It is in everyone's interest to maintain a robust peace between the two neighboring states. No one, save the fundamentalist Islamists, will benefit from renewed strife between Egypt and Israel.
While it is unlikely for the relationship to quickly terminate in the near future, this is the second major instance in a month where Egypt's new government has failed to prevent attacks directed at Israel. This is a worrisome trend, demonstrating not only that the Egyptians do not fully control their territory but also putting unnecessary strain between two of the region's most powerful states. Peace between Egypt and Israel is essential for continued stability in the Middle East.
Thursday, September 8, 2011
Showdown at the UN and a Setback in the Middle East
According to the New York Times, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has confirmed the Palestinians' decision to appeal to the UN for unilateral statehood. While the vote will undoubtedly fail to pass the Security Council, there is a good chance that it will pass the General Assembly, where the US does not possess a veto.
While in a practical sense the vote is meaningless - the General Assembly does not have the power to grant statehood - the decision to press for unilateral recognition will have severe negative consequences for the Israeli-Arab peace process. Abbas's decision to proceed follows extensive pressure by Israeli, American, and other diplomats to avoid making an international scene at the UN.
The vote could serve to severely raise tensions in the region, already inflamed by the Arab Spring. Some pundits believe that it could spark rioting and Israeli reprisals within the West Bank and Gaza. It has already led to increased divisiveness in the world community as the US Congress has moved to cut funding to any UN organization that supports unilateral Palestinian statehood. But worst of all, it may force Israel, already feeling isolated and abandoned, particularly by its number one ally, to retrench, granting further power to anti-peace extremists. Ultimately, the vote will cause greater polarization between the sides and move them further away from an attainable peace accord.
Undoubtedly, the Obama administration's shoddy handling of the Middle East has contributed to this unfortunate turn of events. Obama's insistence on Israeli preconditions for negotiations, namely an immediate freeze on building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and a bold-faced demand for a settlement based on the 1967 armistice lines, has all but terminated any common ground for negotiations. While these terms will likely be incorporated into any final peace accord, they cannot serve as starting points for negotiations.
Obama may understand the need for these terms in any final agreement, but he has allowed his policy wonkery to get in the way of sound politics. His vocalized demands have forced the Israelis to harden their positions, especially given the right-wing basis of the governing Likud coalition. Likewise, such explicit preconditions have boxed-in Abbas, who can no longer come to the bargaining table deprived of these assurances (the Israelis won't be giving them) without appearing to undermine his people.
This is clearly a huge factor in precipitating Abbas's turn to the UN, a move that angers both the US and Israel. According to the NYT:
While in a practical sense the vote is meaningless - the General Assembly does not have the power to grant statehood - the decision to press for unilateral recognition will have severe negative consequences for the Israeli-Arab peace process. Abbas's decision to proceed follows extensive pressure by Israeli, American, and other diplomats to avoid making an international scene at the UN.
The vote could serve to severely raise tensions in the region, already inflamed by the Arab Spring. Some pundits believe that it could spark rioting and Israeli reprisals within the West Bank and Gaza. It has already led to increased divisiveness in the world community as the US Congress has moved to cut funding to any UN organization that supports unilateral Palestinian statehood. But worst of all, it may force Israel, already feeling isolated and abandoned, particularly by its number one ally, to retrench, granting further power to anti-peace extremists. Ultimately, the vote will cause greater polarization between the sides and move them further away from an attainable peace accord.
Undoubtedly, the Obama administration's shoddy handling of the Middle East has contributed to this unfortunate turn of events. Obama's insistence on Israeli preconditions for negotiations, namely an immediate freeze on building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and a bold-faced demand for a settlement based on the 1967 armistice lines, has all but terminated any common ground for negotiations. While these terms will likely be incorporated into any final peace accord, they cannot serve as starting points for negotiations.
Obama may understand the need for these terms in any final agreement, but he has allowed his policy wonkery to get in the way of sound politics. His vocalized demands have forced the Israelis to harden their positions, especially given the right-wing basis of the governing Likud coalition. Likewise, such explicit preconditions have boxed-in Abbas, who can no longer come to the bargaining table deprived of these assurances (the Israelis won't be giving them) without appearing to undermine his people.
This is clearly a huge factor in precipitating Abbas's turn to the UN, a move that angers both the US and Israel. According to the NYT:
Mr. Abbas says for direct talks to begin, Israel should carry out a short-term freeze in settlement building in the West Bank and East Jerusalem as well as agree that the basis of the talks would be the lines drawn in 1967.This is shame. The Middle East peace process has enough hindrances already and sorely does not need more. Accordingly, any forward movement on a Palestinian state will be thwarted the moment the issue is put to a unilateral vote before the General Assembly. Hopefully, the Palestinian leadership realizes this before it is too late.
Saturday, September 3, 2011
Don't Fear the Islamists
The Arab Spring and the fall of Arab leaders, particularly US-allied dictators such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, have led to much consternation in many circles. While few would refute that the likes of Mubarak, Libya's Qaddafi, or Syria's al-Assad are genuinely good guys, some argue that the stability provided by these despots is preferable to the unknown vacuum that will result after their downfall. Particularly, it is argued, that with radical Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, waiting in the wings, these secular dictators are a safer bet for Western interests.
There is little doubt that another Iran (an Islamist led regime) would not bode well for US interests in the Middle East. Even Syria, the most anti-Western regime currently experiencing Arab Spring turmoil, could tilt further towards the Iranians. However, these fears are considerably overblown. There is much ground to believe that even if Islamist groups gain greater control in these countries that the outcome will be more benign than many doomsdayers predict.
First, it is far from clear that many Islamist groups want to control their governments. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, has disavowed any attempt to control the legislature and is running an incomplete slate of candidates. Arguably this is because many Islamists are concerned that the next general government will fail and thus feel it is best to be in opposition, not in control. Furthermore, many prefer to target the softer realms of government - welfare, religion, health services, etc. - and are not quite ready to take on the higher politics of foreign policy and economic affairs.
This later point dovetails with the second reason to avoid fear over the changes in the Middle East. The Islamists have, for decades, been a force of opposition. This is a relatively easy role to play, particularly when a country's leadership consists of dictators or military juntas. However, as Islamists step out from this role two trends will emerge. First, there will be growing divergence within the movement. As an opposition they could remain strong and united in saying "no;" as leaders they will invariably differ in how to proceed. [This may be another explanation for why the Islamist leadership is wary about taking full control of the government - they wish to get their base in line before power splits them apart.] Invariably such dissension will weaken the movement and undermine their ability to create serious harm.
The second trend to emerge will be that of moderation. Those who assume leadership positions in democracies with strong non-Islamist bases will be forced to tailor their message and policy goals in order to maintain their position. For instance, Egyptian Islamists have long disparaged the peace accord with Israel, but it seems unlikely that, once running the country, they would choose to create a new enemy on their border by repudiating the deal. Such moderation will lead to further fractionalization of the movements and more amenable rulers.
Finally, it is doubtful whether the Islamist parties, particularly in their present manifestations, will be able to maintain significant popular support to dominate their respective countries. While they have historically been the most vocal and organized critics of the Arab regimes, the Arab Spring has largely been a secular movement. In fact, the recent revolutions largely discredit the Islamist movement, which has failed over the past decades to achieve what these secular, youth movements have achieved over the past year. The Arab Street does not want to shift from secular dictatorships to theocratic ones. This partially explains the moderation of the Islamist movements but will also explain the inevitable rise of more secular parties.
None of this is to say that the next few years will be a time of peace and harmony in the Middle East. Nor is it to suggest that the West's interests will always be paramount under these new regimes - new democracies will undoubtedly be fickle. These new countries will not be younger, carbon-copies of the West but youthful and unique states that blend democratic institutions with experiences and expectations of the Arab and Muslim world. Many policies may be anathema to America sentiments, for instance the treatment of women. However, it is arguable that despite what a Western would call "missteps," most new democratic regimes will not be nearly as threatening as some fear.
In a sense, the un-repression of the Islamists will be their death knell. Their ideology will be unable to withstand the open competition natural to democracy. The superior systems of democracy and freedom will undoubtedly win the hearts and minds of the people, as the Islamists will be forced either to moderate or splinter off into smaller groups. While this may not happen immediately and it is quite possible to have a seriously wrong turn in the short-run, over the long-run it is relatively clear that such an ideology cannot have a long-lasting hold. One only need to look at the current struggles in Iran (and possibly soon to be second revolution) to understand this point.
The West would be wise to co-opt this to the best of their ability. They should facilitate the removal of the current regimes, like Syria, to not only be perceived by the Arab masses as friends of freedom but to undercut the Islamist movements. This will not only provide greater input and sway into the new regimes, but allow more Western-friendly parties to flourish. Additionally, the West needs to exploit the inevitable divisions within Islamist movements, cultivating the most moderate and marginalizing the extremists. While this will not ensure an immediate win on all fronts, it will guarantee the best possible long-term outcome for both the Middle East and the West.
[For two interesting articles that expand on these arguments see "The Rise of the Islamists" by Shadi Hamid and "Terrorism After the Revolution" by Daniel Byman both published in May/June 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs.]
There is little doubt that another Iran (an Islamist led regime) would not bode well for US interests in the Middle East. Even Syria, the most anti-Western regime currently experiencing Arab Spring turmoil, could tilt further towards the Iranians. However, these fears are considerably overblown. There is much ground to believe that even if Islamist groups gain greater control in these countries that the outcome will be more benign than many doomsdayers predict.
First, it is far from clear that many Islamist groups want to control their governments. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, has disavowed any attempt to control the legislature and is running an incomplete slate of candidates. Arguably this is because many Islamists are concerned that the next general government will fail and thus feel it is best to be in opposition, not in control. Furthermore, many prefer to target the softer realms of government - welfare, religion, health services, etc. - and are not quite ready to take on the higher politics of foreign policy and economic affairs.
This later point dovetails with the second reason to avoid fear over the changes in the Middle East. The Islamists have, for decades, been a force of opposition. This is a relatively easy role to play, particularly when a country's leadership consists of dictators or military juntas. However, as Islamists step out from this role two trends will emerge. First, there will be growing divergence within the movement. As an opposition they could remain strong and united in saying "no;" as leaders they will invariably differ in how to proceed. [This may be another explanation for why the Islamist leadership is wary about taking full control of the government - they wish to get their base in line before power splits them apart.] Invariably such dissension will weaken the movement and undermine their ability to create serious harm.
The second trend to emerge will be that of moderation. Those who assume leadership positions in democracies with strong non-Islamist bases will be forced to tailor their message and policy goals in order to maintain their position. For instance, Egyptian Islamists have long disparaged the peace accord with Israel, but it seems unlikely that, once running the country, they would choose to create a new enemy on their border by repudiating the deal. Such moderation will lead to further fractionalization of the movements and more amenable rulers.
Finally, it is doubtful whether the Islamist parties, particularly in their present manifestations, will be able to maintain significant popular support to dominate their respective countries. While they have historically been the most vocal and organized critics of the Arab regimes, the Arab Spring has largely been a secular movement. In fact, the recent revolutions largely discredit the Islamist movement, which has failed over the past decades to achieve what these secular, youth movements have achieved over the past year. The Arab Street does not want to shift from secular dictatorships to theocratic ones. This partially explains the moderation of the Islamist movements but will also explain the inevitable rise of more secular parties.
None of this is to say that the next few years will be a time of peace and harmony in the Middle East. Nor is it to suggest that the West's interests will always be paramount under these new regimes - new democracies will undoubtedly be fickle. These new countries will not be younger, carbon-copies of the West but youthful and unique states that blend democratic institutions with experiences and expectations of the Arab and Muslim world. Many policies may be anathema to America sentiments, for instance the treatment of women. However, it is arguable that despite what a Western would call "missteps," most new democratic regimes will not be nearly as threatening as some fear.
In a sense, the un-repression of the Islamists will be their death knell. Their ideology will be unable to withstand the open competition natural to democracy. The superior systems of democracy and freedom will undoubtedly win the hearts and minds of the people, as the Islamists will be forced either to moderate or splinter off into smaller groups. While this may not happen immediately and it is quite possible to have a seriously wrong turn in the short-run, over the long-run it is relatively clear that such an ideology cannot have a long-lasting hold. One only need to look at the current struggles in Iran (and possibly soon to be second revolution) to understand this point.
The West would be wise to co-opt this to the best of their ability. They should facilitate the removal of the current regimes, like Syria, to not only be perceived by the Arab masses as friends of freedom but to undercut the Islamist movements. This will not only provide greater input and sway into the new regimes, but allow more Western-friendly parties to flourish. Additionally, the West needs to exploit the inevitable divisions within Islamist movements, cultivating the most moderate and marginalizing the extremists. While this will not ensure an immediate win on all fronts, it will guarantee the best possible long-term outcome for both the Middle East and the West.
[For two interesting articles that expand on these arguments see "The Rise of the Islamists" by Shadi Hamid and "Terrorism After the Revolution" by Daniel Byman both published in May/June 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs.]
Sunday, August 21, 2011
Hamas's Political Weakening May Help Israel
The political dynamics in the Middle East are slowly changing - quite possibly in Israel's favor. A Reuters article reports that Iran has cut funding to Hamas due to the Palestinian movement's refusal to support besieged Syrian President Bashar Assad. Hamas, which has its political headquarters in the Syrian capitol, Damascus, has long been used by Iran as a political and terrorist weapon against Israel (Hamas currently controls the Gaza Strip). However, the Iranian leadership is obviously quite upset at Hamas's failure to support the fellow Iranian proxies in Syria. Assad, who is backed by Iran, has been increasingly under threat as popular revolts against the dictator have increased. The Syrian regime has also faced increasing illegitimacy across the globe as many leaders, including recently President Obama, have called for Assad's resignation.
Reuters also reports that Hamas has lost funding from its Muslim Brotherhood supporters who are fueling the Arab Spring revolts in Egypt.
Hamas is also widely believed to receive money from the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's most popular and organised political force. Diplomats said those payments also may have been reduced because the Brotherhood has diverted funds to support the so-called Arab Spring revolts.Hamas's financial and political woes may bode well for Israel. Hamas has recently indicated a desire for a ceasefire with Israel. According to reports this ceasefire will go into effect Sunday evening. This followed a series of bloody attacks in southern Israel this past week, perpetrated by the PRC, a group of Muslim terrorist seemingly unaffiliated with Hamas. Israel has responded forcefully to both the PRC attacks and subsequent rocket strikes from Gaza.
All of this seems to suggest that the political turmoil within the Arab states may be weakening Israel's enemies. Growing infighting among anti-Israel groups, the weakening of dictatorial Arab regimes, and the loss of Iranian influence appear to have strengthened Israel's position. While the loss of Egypt's Mubarak and the possible increase in Islamist power in Egypt, may have some detrimental effects for Israel, ultimately it appears that the weakening of Hamas, Syria, and Iran may be quite beneficial for Israel. (Egypt, under Mubarak, was a nominal ally of Israel's and now may be taking a more Islamist-friendly approach, as the recent PRC attacks, launched from Egyptian-controlled Sinai, show.)
Monday, March 28, 2011
A Marshall Plan for the Middle East: Part II: The New Vision
The followup to A Marshall Plan for the Middle East: Part I: An Old Approach Reborn is now available on FutureChallenges. The second half, The New Vision, builds on the earlier call to reconcile Western security needs with democracy promotion in the Middle East. It aims to begin a discussion on what specific forms a new Marshall Plan would take and outline some potential risks and concerns that Western architects should take into consideration before rushing into a new plan.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Time to Support Obama
As the far-left has assumed its normal, although currently somewhat subdued, opposition to war, many Republicans have begun to position themselves against the administration’s actions in Libya. Seemingly, much of this opposition on the right comes from politically- not ideologically-motivated origins. While budgetary concerns are certainly high in the minds of many Tea Party-infused congressmen, the GOP should be careful to avoid opposing a policy just because Obama initiated it.
A number of Republicans have begun speaking out against the mission. Some of this questioning is certainly appropriate. For instance, Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) was correct to press Obama on the objectives of the mission in a recent letter sent to the president. However, like many Republicans, Boehner walks a fine line between assisting the war-wary president to define the United States’ goals and commitments and, on the other hand, fomenting an unwise charge against the intervention in Libya.
As outlined in the letter, there are a number of tactical considerations that must be publically clarified. Presumably some of Obama’s hesitation is due to the image of the anti-war president that he assiduously crafted as a candidate. But while questioning these tactical and even broader strategic concerns is valid, the underlying need and motivation for intervention should be off the table.
Not only would such partisan attacks smack of raw politics but they would establish a huge contradiction within Republican ideology. Republicans have spent over a decade defending the need to promote democracy across the globe. While there have arguably been missteps in the implementation of this mission, the underlying goal is sound. For a few partisan points in their political battle with Obama, it would be foolish to throw all of this away.
Instead, Republicans should jump on board with the no-fly zone, throwing their support behind the president and showing America that when the Democrats choose to do the right thing, bipartisanship can prevail. Not every policy initiated by the current administration need be opposed; fighting across the aisle is only warranted when the other side is grossly out of line, for instance as the Democrats were on Obamacare. Americans want to see this country moved in the right direction; they do not want to see consistent bickering.
The call, by some Republicans, including Utah’s congressmen, Jason Chaffetz, for congressional authorization of the no-fly zone is a prime example of this misguided policy. Relying upon Obama’s own asinine comments made to this effect while a candidate, Chaffetz argues that the president must turn to Congress for approval. This argument, though, is a straw-man, used by the opposition party for decades. Congress has not officially declared war since World War II, while numerous military actions have been initiated by presidents in the years since. The ability of the president, as commander-in-chief, to send troops into battle has been a long-settled issue. While Congress should undoubtedly be consulted prior to military action and should maintain certain controls and inputs into its execution, the current criticisms are nothing but transparent attacks on the office of the president.
Republicans should not join the far-left in this attack. That ground should be left to Dennis Kucinich and his loony friends who are mulling impeaching Obama. Instead, if the GOP feels the need to separate itself from the administration, it could look to some of the mistakes made in the implementation of the no-fly zone, in particular the long delay in its initiation. Jonah Goldberg, at National Review Online, makes the most poignant argument in this regard. While fully supporting the mission, he argues that the delay in getting it started has added some considerable difficulties. Goldberg blames this on Obama’s desire to be a multilateralist and fear of “too much unilateral hot-dogging” if the United States had taken the lead. His analysis is quite astute and correctly separates the tactical blunders made by the administration from the strategic necessity of intervention.
For Republicans who cut their teeth on opposition to this president, throwing their weight behind him will be a bitter pill to swallow. But doing right, by American interests, their principles, and the Libyan people, is far more important than partisan brownie points. Republicans need to show their principles and their mettle and support the president.
As outlined in the letter, there are a number of tactical considerations that must be publically clarified. Presumably some of Obama’s hesitation is due to the image of the anti-war president that he assiduously crafted as a candidate. But while questioning these tactical and even broader strategic concerns is valid, the underlying need and motivation for intervention should be off the table.
Not only would such partisan attacks smack of raw politics but they would establish a huge contradiction within Republican ideology. Republicans have spent over a decade defending the need to promote democracy across the globe. While there have arguably been missteps in the implementation of this mission, the underlying goal is sound. For a few partisan points in their political battle with Obama, it would be foolish to throw all of this away.
Instead, Republicans should jump on board with the no-fly zone, throwing their support behind the president and showing America that when the Democrats choose to do the right thing, bipartisanship can prevail. Not every policy initiated by the current administration need be opposed; fighting across the aisle is only warranted when the other side is grossly out of line, for instance as the Democrats were on Obamacare. Americans want to see this country moved in the right direction; they do not want to see consistent bickering.
The call, by some Republicans, including Utah’s congressmen, Jason Chaffetz, for congressional authorization of the no-fly zone is a prime example of this misguided policy. Relying upon Obama’s own asinine comments made to this effect while a candidate, Chaffetz argues that the president must turn to Congress for approval. This argument, though, is a straw-man, used by the opposition party for decades. Congress has not officially declared war since World War II, while numerous military actions have been initiated by presidents in the years since. The ability of the president, as commander-in-chief, to send troops into battle has been a long-settled issue. While Congress should undoubtedly be consulted prior to military action and should maintain certain controls and inputs into its execution, the current criticisms are nothing but transparent attacks on the office of the president.
Republicans should not join the far-left in this attack. That ground should be left to Dennis Kucinich and his loony friends who are mulling impeaching Obama. Instead, if the GOP feels the need to separate itself from the administration, it could look to some of the mistakes made in the implementation of the no-fly zone, in particular the long delay in its initiation. Jonah Goldberg, at National Review Online, makes the most poignant argument in this regard. While fully supporting the mission, he argues that the delay in getting it started has added some considerable difficulties. Goldberg blames this on Obama’s desire to be a multilateralist and fear of “too much unilateral hot-dogging” if the United States had taken the lead. His analysis is quite astute and correctly separates the tactical blunders made by the administration from the strategic necessity of intervention.
For Republicans who cut their teeth on opposition to this president, throwing their weight behind him will be a bitter pill to swallow. But doing right, by American interests, their principles, and the Libyan people, is far more important than partisan brownie points. Republicans need to show their principles and their mettle and support the president.
Tuesday, March 22, 2011
A Marshall Plan for the Middle East - Part I
My newest article, A Marshall Plan for the Middle East: Part I, on FutureChallenges (a division of the Bertelsmann Foundation) discusses the need to develop a new approach to the current revolutionary fervor in the Middle East and North Africa. Relying upon lessons from the Marshall Plan, the post-WWII plan to rehabilitate Europe and prevent the growth of communism, the article argues that the West must rely upon techniques to foster democracy in the Middle East in order to not only promote Western ideology but to strengthen Western security. The frequent debate, within policy and journalist circles, between those who support democracy promotion (liberals) and those who support regime stability in order to maintain security (realists), is increasingly irrelevant - a product of an outmoded way of thinking. The two goals are, particularly in the long-run, mutually inclusive.
Thursday, February 3, 2011
Egypt Aflame
As Egypt descends into greater chaos, the United States is left in the awkward position that generally befalls great powers when their dictator friends are driven from power. The tension between realist foreign policy and liberal democracy promotion is never starker. Whether to support the faltering Mubarak regime or defend the revolutionary movement’s democratic principles is the question that commands the discussion and astoundingly, in our increasingly partisan climate, has no party loyalty.
The arguments criss-cross the political landscape. For instance, the Washington Post’s liberal commentator, Richard Cohen, has told the Obama administration to “just shut up.” One of Israel’s leading papers, Ha’aretz, criticizes the president claiming “Barack Obama will be remembered as the president who ‘lost’ Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt.” Alternatively, William Kristol, at the neoconservative Weekly Standard, urges Obama to do more to support the removal of the Egyptian leadership. Likewise, Francis Fukuyama argues that "liberals had better get organized" to build a new Egypt.
Understandably, the administration is cautious. The United States’ course of action could have severe implications for the fate of the region and American interests. However, a reluctance to place all bets on one side or the other is not the same as inaction. While in recent days the president has, after Mubarak effectively tendered his upcoming resignation (he will not run for reelection in September), come out in support of a peaceful transition, the administration has failed to develop a successful political stance that will allow the best possible result for Egypt and America’s interests. Instead, it largely remains on the sidelines, watching and waiting.
The tension between courses of action is clear. On the one hand, there is security in stability. Hosni Mubarak, for all his domestic flaws, is a known entity. He has been a reliable ally and supposedly kept the worst enemies – currently the Muslim Brotherhood – from dominating Egypt. (This is debatable as some argue that he has aided the Brotherhood’s cause in order to have a bogeyman that will maintain America’s support for his regime.) Since the most established political opposition consists of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, the fear is that Mubarak’s fall will lead to an Islamist state, reminiscent of the Iranian regime which overthrew the Shah in 1979 and remains in power today. Proponents of supporting Mubarak fear the worst outcome – replacing a friendly, undemocratic dictator with an unfriendly, (nominally) democratic, Islamist state.
This stands in sharp contrast to the principle of democracy-promotion, which emphasizes the spread of liberal values that so many Americans hold dear. These arguments, which come both from the left and the neocon right, argue that establishing true democracy is, in addition to being morally right, necessary for US security. From this perspective, steps should be taken to facilitate and aid the pro-democracy forces, allowing the dictatorship to be replaced with a system that will not only be democratic, but remain friendly to the West.
The US is thus stuck in an uncomfortable position. If it backs Mubarak, it will be accused of abandoning its principles and solidify its label as an enemy of the Egyptian people. If the current regime – with or without Mubarak – maintains power, the US will “win” in the short-run, yet inevitably rack-up indubitable costs to be paid when the regime ultimately falters. On the other hand, if despite US support for the regime, the revolution wins the fight, the Muslim Brotherhood will gather enough fodder to portray the clash as the West versus Islam, all but solidifying their ascent.
Conversely, if the administration completely abandons the Egyptian leadership, throwing its weight behind the revolution, it runs the risk of opening a Pandora’s Box of unknown consequences. The revolution could turn in favor of the Brotherhood or take a more Western-oriented path to democracy. Furthermore, such vocalized support from America could have a wider effect of destabilizing the regimes across the Middle East. The unknowns are incalculable and potential deadly.
So what is the administration to do? Certainly, it cannot, as Cohen argues, just sit on the sidelines and watch. Instead, it must do what it can to coax the best possible outcome, namely a liberal democracy, while minimizing the likelihood of the worst outcome, an Islamist state run by the Muslim Brotherhood. For better or worse, the middle outcome – a Western allied dictatorship – is no longer an option. Even if the current regime hangs on through this upheaval, it will only be a matter of time before the people rise again.
Practically, the administration needs to express the need for institutionalized democracy. The US (and Europe) must lend support to anyone within Egypt who desires to build democratic institutions. Institutions that provide checks and balances and diffusion of power must be established. This will give structure to an emerging democracy, put the US on the side of the people (as it should be), and limit the power of those non-democratic elements to exchange a Western-friendly dictatorship for an antagonistic dictatorship of Sharia. (To be clear, a government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, even if popularly elected would be no democracy. As Hamas’s election in the Gaza Strip clearly shows, a democracy is much more than simply voting.) While admittedly this path should have been taken years ago, it is not too late for the United States to show that it is willing to help the Egyptians achieve a system based on the noble principles which America represents.
The US need not come out for or against Mubarak. Nor should it back individuals or specific groups with the opposition. There does not need to be an Egyptian Nouri al-Maliki or Hamid Karzai; in fact it is probably better if such an individual does not exist. While Mohammad al-Baradei is weakly touted as the one to fill this role, the US would be wise not to cultivate the next leader of Egypt but to stand with the people and their desire for a new system. The focus should be on encouraging the construction of viable institutions that will lead to a stable democracy in whatever fashion the Egyptians choose to build such a system. The US's approach should not be about individuals or groups; we should not be picking winners or losers for the Egyptians, but about helping them convert the principles that we, and apparently they, value into living, breathing institutions.
Not only will this show the average Egyptian that the US does care about their plight, thus minimizing the rallying cry of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it will greatly contribute to the US’s security. While the transition may be scary, it is far better to have a democracy in Egypt than a dictatorship, which not only commits abuses but is prone to failure (as we are now seeing). The more the US fails to recognize that its security is better served by developing democracy, in a careful manner, the greater the likelihood is that it continues to bolster the very enemies which will one day seize power and stand in opposition to the West. Just as it is in America, power is vested in the people, whether they are temporarily stripped of it or not. By supporting their cause, we silence those who despise us, and achieve both the moral and the secure outcome.
Tranisitions to democracy always have risks and unknowns. It took the United States over 200 years to build its system and its work is not done. But these risks, in the long-run, are worth it. Where our democracy building has failed is in the top-down approach, rather than benevolent assistance at the grassroots in aiding the development of institutions. However, if we are honest with ourselves and the application of our principles, we need not fear a tradeoff between security and promotion of democracy. In fact they become intricately linked. Allowing Egypt to change its course, does not mean letting a revolution run rampant, but playing an active role in directing its flow. Damming up this energy, as was recently allowed to happen in Iran, will only hurt American interests in the end.
The arguments criss-cross the political landscape. For instance, the Washington Post’s liberal commentator, Richard Cohen, has told the Obama administration to “just shut up.” One of Israel’s leading papers, Ha’aretz, criticizes the president claiming “Barack Obama will be remembered as the president who ‘lost’ Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt.” Alternatively, William Kristol, at the neoconservative Weekly Standard, urges Obama to do more to support the removal of the Egyptian leadership. Likewise, Francis Fukuyama argues that "liberals had better get organized" to build a new Egypt.
Understandably, the administration is cautious. The United States’ course of action could have severe implications for the fate of the region and American interests. However, a reluctance to place all bets on one side or the other is not the same as inaction. While in recent days the president has, after Mubarak effectively tendered his upcoming resignation (he will not run for reelection in September), come out in support of a peaceful transition, the administration has failed to develop a successful political stance that will allow the best possible result for Egypt and America’s interests. Instead, it largely remains on the sidelines, watching and waiting.
The tension between courses of action is clear. On the one hand, there is security in stability. Hosni Mubarak, for all his domestic flaws, is a known entity. He has been a reliable ally and supposedly kept the worst enemies – currently the Muslim Brotherhood – from dominating Egypt. (This is debatable as some argue that he has aided the Brotherhood’s cause in order to have a bogeyman that will maintain America’s support for his regime.) Since the most established political opposition consists of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, the fear is that Mubarak’s fall will lead to an Islamist state, reminiscent of the Iranian regime which overthrew the Shah in 1979 and remains in power today. Proponents of supporting Mubarak fear the worst outcome – replacing a friendly, undemocratic dictator with an unfriendly, (nominally) democratic, Islamist state.
This stands in sharp contrast to the principle of democracy-promotion, which emphasizes the spread of liberal values that so many Americans hold dear. These arguments, which come both from the left and the neocon right, argue that establishing true democracy is, in addition to being morally right, necessary for US security. From this perspective, steps should be taken to facilitate and aid the pro-democracy forces, allowing the dictatorship to be replaced with a system that will not only be democratic, but remain friendly to the West.
The US is thus stuck in an uncomfortable position. If it backs Mubarak, it will be accused of abandoning its principles and solidify its label as an enemy of the Egyptian people. If the current regime – with or without Mubarak – maintains power, the US will “win” in the short-run, yet inevitably rack-up indubitable costs to be paid when the regime ultimately falters. On the other hand, if despite US support for the regime, the revolution wins the fight, the Muslim Brotherhood will gather enough fodder to portray the clash as the West versus Islam, all but solidifying their ascent.
Conversely, if the administration completely abandons the Egyptian leadership, throwing its weight behind the revolution, it runs the risk of opening a Pandora’s Box of unknown consequences. The revolution could turn in favor of the Brotherhood or take a more Western-oriented path to democracy. Furthermore, such vocalized support from America could have a wider effect of destabilizing the regimes across the Middle East. The unknowns are incalculable and potential deadly.
So what is the administration to do? Certainly, it cannot, as Cohen argues, just sit on the sidelines and watch. Instead, it must do what it can to coax the best possible outcome, namely a liberal democracy, while minimizing the likelihood of the worst outcome, an Islamist state run by the Muslim Brotherhood. For better or worse, the middle outcome – a Western allied dictatorship – is no longer an option. Even if the current regime hangs on through this upheaval, it will only be a matter of time before the people rise again.
Practically, the administration needs to express the need for institutionalized democracy. The US (and Europe) must lend support to anyone within Egypt who desires to build democratic institutions. Institutions that provide checks and balances and diffusion of power must be established. This will give structure to an emerging democracy, put the US on the side of the people (as it should be), and limit the power of those non-democratic elements to exchange a Western-friendly dictatorship for an antagonistic dictatorship of Sharia. (To be clear, a government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, even if popularly elected would be no democracy. As Hamas’s election in the Gaza Strip clearly shows, a democracy is much more than simply voting.) While admittedly this path should have been taken years ago, it is not too late for the United States to show that it is willing to help the Egyptians achieve a system based on the noble principles which America represents.
The US need not come out for or against Mubarak. Nor should it back individuals or specific groups with the opposition. There does not need to be an Egyptian Nouri al-Maliki or Hamid Karzai; in fact it is probably better if such an individual does not exist. While Mohammad al-Baradei is weakly touted as the one to fill this role, the US would be wise not to cultivate the next leader of Egypt but to stand with the people and their desire for a new system. The focus should be on encouraging the construction of viable institutions that will lead to a stable democracy in whatever fashion the Egyptians choose to build such a system. The US's approach should not be about individuals or groups; we should not be picking winners or losers for the Egyptians, but about helping them convert the principles that we, and apparently they, value into living, breathing institutions.
Not only will this show the average Egyptian that the US does care about their plight, thus minimizing the rallying cry of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it will greatly contribute to the US’s security. While the transition may be scary, it is far better to have a democracy in Egypt than a dictatorship, which not only commits abuses but is prone to failure (as we are now seeing). The more the US fails to recognize that its security is better served by developing democracy, in a careful manner, the greater the likelihood is that it continues to bolster the very enemies which will one day seize power and stand in opposition to the West. Just as it is in America, power is vested in the people, whether they are temporarily stripped of it or not. By supporting their cause, we silence those who despise us, and achieve both the moral and the secure outcome.
Tranisitions to democracy always have risks and unknowns. It took the United States over 200 years to build its system and its work is not done. But these risks, in the long-run, are worth it. Where our democracy building has failed is in the top-down approach, rather than benevolent assistance at the grassroots in aiding the development of institutions. However, if we are honest with ourselves and the application of our principles, we need not fear a tradeoff between security and promotion of democracy. In fact they become intricately linked. Allowing Egypt to change its course, does not mean letting a revolution run rampant, but playing an active role in directing its flow. Damming up this energy, as was recently allowed to happen in Iran, will only hurt American interests in the end.
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
WikiLeaks and a Middle East Peace on FutureChallenges.org
The post, WikiLeaks and a Middle East Peace?, originally written on ANR is now an expanded article on FutureChallenges.org. Check out the Security and Anti-Terrorism section for the full article, now called "WorthyLeaks?: Could WikiLeaks Have Some Positive Results?"
The article discusses a possibility of the WikiLeaks disclosures having some positive effects on diplomacy - in particular in the Middle East.
The article discusses a possibility of the WikiLeaks disclosures having some positive effects on diplomacy - in particular in the Middle East.
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
WikiLeaks and a Middle East Peace?
Could the WikiLeaks disclosures, which are causing all sorts of negative fallout for the Obama administration’s foreign policy, actually lead to some foreign policy successes? Regarding most of the leaks the upshot will probably run the gamut from benign, to embarrassing, to trivially detrimental; however, there is one area where there may be a potential, albeit slight, for a constructive outcome.
Two facts, which were previously widely assumed, have now been confirmed. The first is the growing fear in the Arab world about Iran’s expanding power and nuclear ambitions. The second is Israel’s clandestine diplomacy with these same Arab powers.
Regarding the former, leaked documents show a number of Arab states’ unease with Iran’s nuclear program. These documents, as reported in the Financial Times, call for the US to stop Iran’s ambitions, including with direct attacks. This is relatively unsurprising as balancing between the big Arab states and Iran is a constant feature of the region. No Arab state, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the other two regional heavyweights, want to see a nuclear Iran.
Likewise, the disclosure of Israel’s communications with some of these states is unsurprising. Israel does not have official diplomatic channels with most Arab nations; however, despite public rhetoric they do often have common concerns.
While none of this is surprising to the casual follower of the region, most know that these Arab leaders say one thing in public while another thing behind closed doors. Much of this, of course, is due to the strong opinions of the Arab street and Muslim fundamentalists. However, now the metaphorical cat is out of the bag.
What is done with this “cat” though could have interesting consequences for the region. Most likely the Arab states will attempt to distance themselves from these revelations, brushing them off as distortions or simply ignoring the leaks. However, if the Arab leadership address these facts head-on and take ownership, it could profoundly alter the political map.
As both sets of disclosures prove, Israel and the Arab states are, at least in some issues, on the same side. In particular, Iran represents a growing threat to stability in the region and, at a minimum in Israel’s case, an existential threat. Currently, however, Arab nations and Israel are precluded from working together largely by the Arab street’s political pressure over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Islamic fundamentalism’s abhorrence of the Jewish state.
While admittedly these place enormous constraints on the Arab leadership, who might very well lose their power if they worked openly with Israel, the animosity towards Israel is increasingly a strategic anchor. The Jewish state is no longer the (perceived) greatest threat to the Arab world, just as the Palestinian problem is no longer the most significant issue for Israel.
This opens the door for expanded coordination between the Arab world and Israel and, daresay, a potential path to peace. Rather than spurning these disclosures, Arab leaders should attempt to use these revelations of their true security concerns to begin a (yes, slight) redirection of the Arab street’s focus. While a rush to normalized diplomatic relations with Israel is probably premature, the Arab leaders can use the WikiLeaks disclosures as a first hole in the dike which has separated Israel and the Arabs for some 60 years.
Rapprochement between Israel and the Arab states is essential for both regional and individual state security. While domestic conditions certainly make this difficult, WikiLeaks may have helped get the ball rolling. It is certainly too early to tell where this will lead, but ironically someday Julian Assange might be called a hero (okay I doubt that) for lighting the spark that checked Iran’s nuclear rise and precipitating peace between Israel and the Arabs.
Two facts, which were previously widely assumed, have now been confirmed. The first is the growing fear in the Arab world about Iran’s expanding power and nuclear ambitions. The second is Israel’s clandestine diplomacy with these same Arab powers.
Regarding the former, leaked documents show a number of Arab states’ unease with Iran’s nuclear program. These documents, as reported in the Financial Times, call for the US to stop Iran’s ambitions, including with direct attacks. This is relatively unsurprising as balancing between the big Arab states and Iran is a constant feature of the region. No Arab state, particularly Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the other two regional heavyweights, want to see a nuclear Iran.
Likewise, the disclosure of Israel’s communications with some of these states is unsurprising. Israel does not have official diplomatic channels with most Arab nations; however, despite public rhetoric they do often have common concerns.
While none of this is surprising to the casual follower of the region, most know that these Arab leaders say one thing in public while another thing behind closed doors. Much of this, of course, is due to the strong opinions of the Arab street and Muslim fundamentalists. However, now the metaphorical cat is out of the bag.
What is done with this “cat” though could have interesting consequences for the region. Most likely the Arab states will attempt to distance themselves from these revelations, brushing them off as distortions or simply ignoring the leaks. However, if the Arab leadership address these facts head-on and take ownership, it could profoundly alter the political map.
As both sets of disclosures prove, Israel and the Arab states are, at least in some issues, on the same side. In particular, Iran represents a growing threat to stability in the region and, at a minimum in Israel’s case, an existential threat. Currently, however, Arab nations and Israel are precluded from working together largely by the Arab street’s political pressure over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Islamic fundamentalism’s abhorrence of the Jewish state.
While admittedly these place enormous constraints on the Arab leadership, who might very well lose their power if they worked openly with Israel, the animosity towards Israel is increasingly a strategic anchor. The Jewish state is no longer the (perceived) greatest threat to the Arab world, just as the Palestinian problem is no longer the most significant issue for Israel.
This opens the door for expanded coordination between the Arab world and Israel and, daresay, a potential path to peace. Rather than spurning these disclosures, Arab leaders should attempt to use these revelations of their true security concerns to begin a (yes, slight) redirection of the Arab street’s focus. While a rush to normalized diplomatic relations with Israel is probably premature, the Arab leaders can use the WikiLeaks disclosures as a first hole in the dike which has separated Israel and the Arabs for some 60 years.
Rapprochement between Israel and the Arab states is essential for both regional and individual state security. While domestic conditions certainly make this difficult, WikiLeaks may have helped get the ball rolling. It is certainly too early to tell where this will lead, but ironically someday Julian Assange might be called a hero (okay I doubt that) for lighting the spark that checked Iran’s nuclear rise and precipitating peace between Israel and the Arabs.
Monday, July 27, 2009
Will Israel Attack Iran?
In a recent meeting with the US, Israel reaffirmed that “no option should be ruled out” when dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat. The meeting between US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and his Israeli counterpart, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, reconfirms the tensions created by the Iranian quest for nuclear weaponry.
Given Iran’s historical belligerence towards Israel, the tiny nation is correct to view Ahmadinejad and his cronies as an existential threat. The Iranian despot has repeatedly called for the destruction of the Jewish state. The achievement of an Iranian nuke would be the harbinger of the death of Israel. However, it is unlikely that Israel would allow the Iranian nuclear program to reach this terminal stage. Well before such a point, Israel would most certainly launch an attack on the Persian state. Such an attack would have profound effects on Israel and the entire Middle East.
An Israeli attack would lead to a heavy handed Iranian reprisal that would quickly embroil the Middle East into a regional war— which quite possibly could spread into a broader conflagration. Israel of course knows this and logically wants to avoid such a destabilizing act. However, the choice is clear when given an option between annihilation and fighting to prevent destruction. Barak stated, “We are not blind. We know everything we do has implications on our neighbors, we take this into account, but ultimately we are committed to Israel's security interests."
The crucial question is: ‘When do the Israelis feel they have reached the point-of-no-return?’ The Iranian nuclear program is far more complex than the Iraqi program which Israel successfully ended with the bombing of Osirak in 1981. A single surgical strike would be unable to end the Iranian program. This implies that upon deciding to attack Iran, Israel would have to use a considerable amount of force. Such a need of force will certainly delay an Israeli strike; however, only to a certain point. If Israeli intelligence indicates that a nuclear Iran is imminent, the country will strike.
All of this heightens the need for America, and the world community, to increase pressure on Iran. The Iranian nuclear program needs to be halted immediately. However, the Obama administration’s insistence on making nice with our enemies and bullying our friends is counterproductive to this aim. The administration’s warped view of foreign policy, as successfully slammed in The Wall Street Journal, is not only unwise but downright foolish. Obama continues to push Israel and court Iran. Ultimately, this will increase Israel’s insecurity and accelerate the ‘point-of-no-return’. After nearly eight months in office, it is time that Obama realizes his foreign policy is leading the world down a dangerous path. Hopefully, he will change his tune before a disastrous war in the Middle East forces him to.
Given Iran’s historical belligerence towards Israel, the tiny nation is correct to view Ahmadinejad and his cronies as an existential threat. The Iranian despot has repeatedly called for the destruction of the Jewish state. The achievement of an Iranian nuke would be the harbinger of the death of Israel. However, it is unlikely that Israel would allow the Iranian nuclear program to reach this terminal stage. Well before such a point, Israel would most certainly launch an attack on the Persian state. Such an attack would have profound effects on Israel and the entire Middle East.
An Israeli attack would lead to a heavy handed Iranian reprisal that would quickly embroil the Middle East into a regional war— which quite possibly could spread into a broader conflagration. Israel of course knows this and logically wants to avoid such a destabilizing act. However, the choice is clear when given an option between annihilation and fighting to prevent destruction. Barak stated, “We are not blind. We know everything we do has implications on our neighbors, we take this into account, but ultimately we are committed to Israel's security interests."
The crucial question is: ‘When do the Israelis feel they have reached the point-of-no-return?’ The Iranian nuclear program is far more complex than the Iraqi program which Israel successfully ended with the bombing of Osirak in 1981. A single surgical strike would be unable to end the Iranian program. This implies that upon deciding to attack Iran, Israel would have to use a considerable amount of force. Such a need of force will certainly delay an Israeli strike; however, only to a certain point. If Israeli intelligence indicates that a nuclear Iran is imminent, the country will strike.
All of this heightens the need for America, and the world community, to increase pressure on Iran. The Iranian nuclear program needs to be halted immediately. However, the Obama administration’s insistence on making nice with our enemies and bullying our friends is counterproductive to this aim. The administration’s warped view of foreign policy, as successfully slammed in The Wall Street Journal, is not only unwise but downright foolish. Obama continues to push Israel and court Iran. Ultimately, this will increase Israel’s insecurity and accelerate the ‘point-of-no-return’. After nearly eight months in office, it is time that Obama realizes his foreign policy is leading the world down a dangerous path. Hopefully, he will change his tune before a disastrous war in the Middle East forces him to.
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Does a Teetering Iran Vindicate the Iraq War? - A Middle Eastern Domino Theory
The recent protests in Iran have added some cracks to the otherwise stable foundation of the Iranian Islamist regime. While the government is still overwhelmingly strong, the democracy movement has the ability to drastically change the political dynamics in the Middle East. Although far from a sure bet, the new Iranian revolution may very well be the second step in a modern day, Middle Eastern ‘domino theory’- preceded by the War in Iraq.
One of the more vocal criticisms of regime change in Iraq was that it unbalanced the region. Iraq kept Iran in line. By removing the Iraqi threat Iran was unleashed. However, as Robert Kaplan points out in a recent Washington Post editorial, this may have been part of the plan. (See here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/23/AR2009062303114.html?wpisrc=newsletter.) In the short-run, a rise in Iranian power is less than desirous; however, it may inevitably let loose a path to real change in the Middle East.
Because of the removal of the Iraqi threat, Iran made a grab for greater regional and international power. The regime was better able to flex its muscle and meddle in regional and foreign affairs without having to be preoccupied with its Western border. This led Iran to directly challenge America and Europe.
Iran’s power move, while seemingly bad for America, had two main effects. First, it caused rebalancing amongst the Arab states. The ‘moderate’ Sunni Arab states of Egypt and Saudi Arabia were now faced with a more imminent danger from Iran. Today, these two states now face numerous new threats to their rule, both domestically and regionally, from an unencumbered Iran. With one foe out of the picture, Iran can increase its focus on these remaining two contenders for regional hegemony. With an increase in Iranian-sponsored terrorism and a direct threat of an Iranian nuclear bomb, it is only natural that the various Sunni Arab states would need to join forces against the upstart Iran. This is beneficial because it pushes these countries closer to the United States, and enables greater strength and flexibility in the region.
Second, Iran’s excessive aggression promoted a pro-democracy movement. The Iranian revolution was born of disgust with the ruling clerics. Amongst the chief complaints, was Ahmadinejad’s bellicose language and antagonism of the West. While certainly not the only cause for revolution, the Iranian leadership’s aggression was a spark that helped incite the powder keg. The moderate reformers were unwilling to see an extremist such as Ahmadinejad lead their country into direct conflict with the U.S. It is unlikely that Ahmadinejad would have been as aggressive, and therefore as repulsive to his people, had Saddam Hussein still been in power.
One possible, fortunate outcome would be a spread of pro-democracy movements throughout the Middle East. As the Arab Street watches the tumult in Iran, it is natural to question the leadership of the remaining Arab despots. While no large movements have started yet, there is considerable talk in the Middle East about the need for reform. Kindred spirits in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are realizing that they can fight for greater rights and freedoms and throw off the yokes of their respective regimes. Lebanon, for instance, has already rejected the Islamist movement of Hezbollah and turned towards the West.
To what extent the Iranian revolution spreads throughout the Middle East is still very much up in the air. The extent of the Iranian reformists’ success is, of course, a huge factor. The repressive measures of the Arab regimes will also play a role. Likewise, reform could come in many shapes- from wholesale regime change to more gradual, internal policy changes. However, this is a profound opportunity for real change in the region- change that has the chance of drastically altering global politics.
One of the more vocal criticisms of regime change in Iraq was that it unbalanced the region. Iraq kept Iran in line. By removing the Iraqi threat Iran was unleashed. However, as Robert Kaplan points out in a recent Washington Post editorial, this may have been part of the plan. (See here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/23/AR2009062303114.html?wpisrc=newsletter.) In the short-run, a rise in Iranian power is less than desirous; however, it may inevitably let loose a path to real change in the Middle East.
Because of the removal of the Iraqi threat, Iran made a grab for greater regional and international power. The regime was better able to flex its muscle and meddle in regional and foreign affairs without having to be preoccupied with its Western border. This led Iran to directly challenge America and Europe.
Iran’s power move, while seemingly bad for America, had two main effects. First, it caused rebalancing amongst the Arab states. The ‘moderate’ Sunni Arab states of Egypt and Saudi Arabia were now faced with a more imminent danger from Iran. Today, these two states now face numerous new threats to their rule, both domestically and regionally, from an unencumbered Iran. With one foe out of the picture, Iran can increase its focus on these remaining two contenders for regional hegemony. With an increase in Iranian-sponsored terrorism and a direct threat of an Iranian nuclear bomb, it is only natural that the various Sunni Arab states would need to join forces against the upstart Iran. This is beneficial because it pushes these countries closer to the United States, and enables greater strength and flexibility in the region.
Second, Iran’s excessive aggression promoted a pro-democracy movement. The Iranian revolution was born of disgust with the ruling clerics. Amongst the chief complaints, was Ahmadinejad’s bellicose language and antagonism of the West. While certainly not the only cause for revolution, the Iranian leadership’s aggression was a spark that helped incite the powder keg. The moderate reformers were unwilling to see an extremist such as Ahmadinejad lead their country into direct conflict with the U.S. It is unlikely that Ahmadinejad would have been as aggressive, and therefore as repulsive to his people, had Saddam Hussein still been in power.
One possible, fortunate outcome would be a spread of pro-democracy movements throughout the Middle East. As the Arab Street watches the tumult in Iran, it is natural to question the leadership of the remaining Arab despots. While no large movements have started yet, there is considerable talk in the Middle East about the need for reform. Kindred spirits in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are realizing that they can fight for greater rights and freedoms and throw off the yokes of their respective regimes. Lebanon, for instance, has already rejected the Islamist movement of Hezbollah and turned towards the West.
To what extent the Iranian revolution spreads throughout the Middle East is still very much up in the air. The extent of the Iranian reformists’ success is, of course, a huge factor. The repressive measures of the Arab regimes will also play a role. Likewise, reform could come in many shapes- from wholesale regime change to more gradual, internal policy changes. However, this is a profound opportunity for real change in the region- change that has the chance of drastically altering global politics.
Friday, June 5, 2009
Obama Speaks to Islam - Part II
The second major issue with Obama’s speech (See the White House http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/) was his over-the-top criticism of Israel. As he did with his discussion of the West’s relationship with Islam (See yesterday’s entry http://anewrepublican.blogspot.com/2009/06/obama-speaks-to-islam-part-i.html), he again pretended to portray the situation as one of two equally culpable sides. Obama used the same format in this discussion. First, he outlined historical grievances, namely the Holocaust, experienced by the Jews. Thankfully, his discussion here was correct and appropriate and took direct aim at Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denial.
Obama then proceeded to give the Palestinian side of the coin. He spoke of all the suffering the Palestinians experienced at the hands of the Israelis. He said,
While understanding the historical context of Israel and the Holocaust is essential to comprehending the Jewish and Israeli psyche, it is not appropriate to pass it off as the sole story of Jewish/Israeli suffering. This is the story that the anti-Israeli Arabs want the world to believe; a story that the Iranian despot Ahmadinejad all too often tries to tell. This ‘poor me’ story roughly goes along the lines of “Well, the Germans hurt the Jews, so now the Jews hurt the Palestinians. The Palestinians have done nothing wrong!” By structuring his speech as he did, Obama willingly, or unwittingly, lent credence to this false argument. This way of thinking completely misinterprets the Israeli position. The Holocaust is a background story that may help to explain Israeli fear. However, today’s problems with the Palestinians stem from a long history of Arab desire to destroy Israel along with current antagonism and continued attacks. Regrettably, Obama fails to see this as he ignored Israeli suffering at the hands of the Palestinians and reduced the Israeli position to one of historical fear.
In his desire to be the ultimate moral relativist, Obama failed to accurately portray the Israeli side of the story. Perhaps he was just pandering to his Muslim audience. More frighteningly, he is backtracking on years of American support for one of our most staunch allies- and the only free democracy in the Middle East. Whichever it is, it is unfortunately feeding unnecessary fuel to the incessant fire of hatred directed at Israel.
Obama then proceeded to give the Palestinian side of the coin. He spoke of all the suffering the Palestinians experienced at the hands of the Israelis. He said,
On the other hand, it is also undeniable that the Palestinian people -- Muslims and Christians -- have suffered in pursuit of a homeland. For more than 60 years they've endured the pain of dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring lands for a life of peace and security that they have never been able to lead. They endure the daily humiliations-- large and small -- that come with occupation. So let there be no doubt: The situation for the Palestinian people is intolerable. And America will not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own.This is the hub of a huge disconnect. The display of ‘two-sides of suffering’ compares supposed Palestinian suffering at the hands of Israelis with Jewish/Israeli suffering at the hands of Germans. Only at one point does he mention the constant attacks Israel suffers at the hands of the Palestinians.
While understanding the historical context of Israel and the Holocaust is essential to comprehending the Jewish and Israeli psyche, it is not appropriate to pass it off as the sole story of Jewish/Israeli suffering. This is the story that the anti-Israeli Arabs want the world to believe; a story that the Iranian despot Ahmadinejad all too often tries to tell. This ‘poor me’ story roughly goes along the lines of “Well, the Germans hurt the Jews, so now the Jews hurt the Palestinians. The Palestinians have done nothing wrong!” By structuring his speech as he did, Obama willingly, or unwittingly, lent credence to this false argument. This way of thinking completely misinterprets the Israeli position. The Holocaust is a background story that may help to explain Israeli fear. However, today’s problems with the Palestinians stem from a long history of Arab desire to destroy Israel along with current antagonism and continued attacks. Regrettably, Obama fails to see this as he ignored Israeli suffering at the hands of the Palestinians and reduced the Israeli position to one of historical fear.
In his desire to be the ultimate moral relativist, Obama failed to accurately portray the Israeli side of the story. Perhaps he was just pandering to his Muslim audience. More frighteningly, he is backtracking on years of American support for one of our most staunch allies- and the only free democracy in the Middle East. Whichever it is, it is unfortunately feeding unnecessary fuel to the incessant fire of hatred directed at Israel.
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
Good Job, Bibi
Thankfully, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu held his ground during his meeting with President Obama, and refused to outright accept a two-state solution. However, his tone and language were far more conciliatory and accommodating than the demonized image presented by the mainstream media. (See the video here http://cosmos.bcst.yahoo.com/up/player/popup/?rn=3906861&cl=13530029&ch=4226716&src=news).
Netanyahu made three pertinent points. First, he expressed a desire to start negotiations immediately (he also mentioned that peace should be regional in nature). Second, he stated that Israel has no desire to govern the Palestinians. He wants them to govern themselves, albeit it without certain parties that would endanger Israel (such as Hamas). While this does not explicitly signify an acceptance of a two-state solution, it shows some recognition of the general concept. Third, the Palestinians need to recognize Israel as Jewish state.
This third point is an important one that is often overlooked. Netanyahu is highly criticized because he does not openly accept a two-state solution; however, the equivalent acceptance on the Palestinian side is even more difficult to discern. Why should the Israelis be held to a higher pre-negotiation standard than the Palestinians? This is particularly concerning because many of the Palestinian groups not only do not accept a two-state solution, but vehemently call for the complete destruction of Israel. How is a nation supposed to negotiate peace with such animosity on the other side?
Even if a two-state solution is the only way to peace, and even if Netanyahu firmly believes in a two-state solution, it is prudent for him to pull back. Over the years, Israel has slowly backed down on positions and received little in return. The rampant anti-Zionism prevalent throughout the world has forced Israel to prematurely give up what should only be given up at the negotiating table. This has been a dangerous pattern for Israel, as it leaves the small nation with a weak hand for final negotiations. It is particularly worrisome in light of the fact that the current US President has not demonstrated the overwhelming support that Israel has experienced with past presidents.
For this reason, Netanyahu is right to step back from making a two-state solution a pre-condition to negotiations. Israel must regain political chips to play in the negotiating game (similar arguments can be made for continued settlement activity). It must set the playing field to ensure that negotiations lead to a final, stable peace, rather than a stepping stone to its eventual destruction.
Netanyahu seems to be accomplishing this. His words were elegant. He did not come out with fire and brimstone, but spoke firmly from a strong position. He is willing to work with the Palestinians, but not be a push-over. He will surely be condemned throughout the world. However, he has shown that he will not fold in the face of Obama. For this he must be commended.
Netanyahu made three pertinent points. First, he expressed a desire to start negotiations immediately (he also mentioned that peace should be regional in nature). Second, he stated that Israel has no desire to govern the Palestinians. He wants them to govern themselves, albeit it without certain parties that would endanger Israel (such as Hamas). While this does not explicitly signify an acceptance of a two-state solution, it shows some recognition of the general concept. Third, the Palestinians need to recognize Israel as Jewish state.
This third point is an important one that is often overlooked. Netanyahu is highly criticized because he does not openly accept a two-state solution; however, the equivalent acceptance on the Palestinian side is even more difficult to discern. Why should the Israelis be held to a higher pre-negotiation standard than the Palestinians? This is particularly concerning because many of the Palestinian groups not only do not accept a two-state solution, but vehemently call for the complete destruction of Israel. How is a nation supposed to negotiate peace with such animosity on the other side?
Even if a two-state solution is the only way to peace, and even if Netanyahu firmly believes in a two-state solution, it is prudent for him to pull back. Over the years, Israel has slowly backed down on positions and received little in return. The rampant anti-Zionism prevalent throughout the world has forced Israel to prematurely give up what should only be given up at the negotiating table. This has been a dangerous pattern for Israel, as it leaves the small nation with a weak hand for final negotiations. It is particularly worrisome in light of the fact that the current US President has not demonstrated the overwhelming support that Israel has experienced with past presidents.
For this reason, Netanyahu is right to step back from making a two-state solution a pre-condition to negotiations. Israel must regain political chips to play in the negotiating game (similar arguments can be made for continued settlement activity). It must set the playing field to ensure that negotiations lead to a final, stable peace, rather than a stepping stone to its eventual destruction.
Netanyahu seems to be accomplishing this. His words were elegant. He did not come out with fire and brimstone, but spoke firmly from a strong position. He is willing to work with the Palestinians, but not be a push-over. He will surely be condemned throughout the world. However, he has shown that he will not fold in the face of Obama. For this he must be commended.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
A Nuclear Tipping Point
“It appears that we are at a ‘tipping point’ in proliferation. If Iran and North Korea proceed unchecked to build nuclear arsenals, there is a serious possibility of a cascade of proliferation following. And as each new nuclear power is added the probability of a terror group getting a nuclear bomb increases.”
So states a recent bi-partisan Congressional Commission report on the “strategic posture” of the United States. The report, which was presented to Congress a week ago, outlines a two-pronged approach for the U.S.’s nuclear policy: (1) continued deterrence and (2) arms control and nonproliferation. (See here for the report http://www.usip.org/strategic_posture/).
Throughout its discussion on nonproliferation, the Commission emphasized that we are at, or near, a dangerous tipping point. It stressed that without continued American and Russian support for nonproliferation we may reach a point where the spread of nuclear weaponry becomes uncontrollable and extremely dangerous.
Implicit in the report, is that a nuclear Iran would spawn a Middle Eastern arms race. Accordingly, some Middle Eastern nations are already in the process of mimicking Iran’s nuclear program. This will have disastrous effects on the already unstable region. The first, more conventional worry revolves around the creation of a new breed of regional nuclear powers. This will weaken America’s position in the region and create a higher stakes political game. It is easy to see how the Middle Eastern dynamic would substantially change with a number of the large states – perhaps Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq (not to mention the already nuclear Israel) – operating under a nuclear umbrella.
More importantly perhaps, is the risk that such a third-world nuclear arms race would be vastly unsecure. These governments run the risk of ‘losing’ weaponry that could find its way into the hands of non-state actors and terrorists. An increase in the number of countries with active nuclear programs greatly increases the probability that a nuclear warhead ends up in Al-Qaeda’s hands. Simply stated, aspiring entrants to the nuclear club do not have the same institutions and controls, or the stable populations (read Islamists) that the current nuclear powers have.
As most people are well aware of, the current stable system of nuclear deterrence and international cooperation is ill equipped to handle such non-state, nuclear powers.
Nonproliferation is necessary to avoid the inevitable struggles that would occur should non-state actors obtain nuclear weaponry. While the Commission report praises Obama for his actions regarding deterrence, it calls on the President to take further steps to set the nonproliferation agenda. “Good leadership,” it states “requires setting the example.” The report goes as far as to state that if Obama’s open-arms approach to Iran and North Korea “fail[s], we might then have reached a point where the nonproliferation regime is substantially if not fatally injured.”
This is a point that Republicans must seize on. While the Right has been consistent in its criticism of Obama’s foreign policy, these criticisms have to take on more of serious policy discussion, rather than the alarmism that is so often used. Obama is taking too much of risk by recognizing Iran’s and North Korea’s demands. The U.S., alongside Russia, must unequivocally state that the ‘nuclear club’ is closed to new members. If we fail to promote nonproliferation, we will move dangerously close to a complete collapse of the stable global nuclear system.
So states a recent bi-partisan Congressional Commission report on the “strategic posture” of the United States. The report, which was presented to Congress a week ago, outlines a two-pronged approach for the U.S.’s nuclear policy: (1) continued deterrence and (2) arms control and nonproliferation. (See here for the report http://www.usip.org/strategic_posture/).
Throughout its discussion on nonproliferation, the Commission emphasized that we are at, or near, a dangerous tipping point. It stressed that without continued American and Russian support for nonproliferation we may reach a point where the spread of nuclear weaponry becomes uncontrollable and extremely dangerous.
Implicit in the report, is that a nuclear Iran would spawn a Middle Eastern arms race. Accordingly, some Middle Eastern nations are already in the process of mimicking Iran’s nuclear program. This will have disastrous effects on the already unstable region. The first, more conventional worry revolves around the creation of a new breed of regional nuclear powers. This will weaken America’s position in the region and create a higher stakes political game. It is easy to see how the Middle Eastern dynamic would substantially change with a number of the large states – perhaps Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq (not to mention the already nuclear Israel) – operating under a nuclear umbrella.
More importantly perhaps, is the risk that such a third-world nuclear arms race would be vastly unsecure. These governments run the risk of ‘losing’ weaponry that could find its way into the hands of non-state actors and terrorists. An increase in the number of countries with active nuclear programs greatly increases the probability that a nuclear warhead ends up in Al-Qaeda’s hands. Simply stated, aspiring entrants to the nuclear club do not have the same institutions and controls, or the stable populations (read Islamists) that the current nuclear powers have.
As most people are well aware of, the current stable system of nuclear deterrence and international cooperation is ill equipped to handle such non-state, nuclear powers.
Nonproliferation is necessary to avoid the inevitable struggles that would occur should non-state actors obtain nuclear weaponry. While the Commission report praises Obama for his actions regarding deterrence, it calls on the President to take further steps to set the nonproliferation agenda. “Good leadership,” it states “requires setting the example.” The report goes as far as to state that if Obama’s open-arms approach to Iran and North Korea “fail[s], we might then have reached a point where the nonproliferation regime is substantially if not fatally injured.”
This is a point that Republicans must seize on. While the Right has been consistent in its criticism of Obama’s foreign policy, these criticisms have to take on more of serious policy discussion, rather than the alarmism that is so often used. Obama is taking too much of risk by recognizing Iran’s and North Korea’s demands. The U.S., alongside Russia, must unequivocally state that the ‘nuclear club’ is closed to new members. If we fail to promote nonproliferation, we will move dangerously close to a complete collapse of the stable global nuclear system.
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