Don't Fear the Islamists

The Arab Spring and the fall of Arab leaders, particularly US-allied dictators such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, have led to much consternation in many circles.  While few would refute that the likes of Mubarak, Libya's Qaddafi, or Syria's al-Assad are genuinely good guys, some argue that the stability provided by these despots is preferable to the unknown vacuum that will result after their downfall.  Particularly, it is argued, that with radical Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, waiting in the wings, these secular dictators are a safer bet for Western interests.

There is little doubt that another Iran (an Islamist led regime) would not bode well for US interests in the Middle East.  Even Syria, the most anti-Western regime currently experiencing Arab Spring turmoil, could tilt further towards the Iranians.  However, these fears are considerably overblown.  There is much ground to believe that even if Islamist groups gain greater control in these countries that the outcome will be more benign than many doomsdayers predict.

First, it is far from clear that many Islamist groups want to control their governments.  Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, has disavowed any attempt to control the legislature and is running an incomplete slate of candidates.  Arguably this is because many Islamists are concerned that the next general government will fail and thus feel it is best to be in opposition, not in control.  Furthermore, many prefer to target the softer realms of government - welfare, religion, health services, etc. - and are not quite ready to take on the higher politics of foreign policy and economic affairs.

This later point dovetails with the second reason to avoid fear over the changes in the Middle East.  The Islamists have, for decades, been a force of opposition.  This is a relatively easy role to play, particularly when a country's leadership consists of dictators or military juntas.  However, as Islamists step out from this role two trends will emerge.  First, there will be growing divergence within the movement.  As an opposition they could remain strong and united in saying "no;" as leaders they will invariably differ in how to proceed. [This may be another explanation for why the Islamist leadership is wary about taking full control of the government - they wish to get their base in line before power splits them apart.]  Invariably such dissension will weaken the movement and undermine their ability to create serious harm.

The second trend to emerge will be that of moderation.  Those who assume leadership positions in democracies with strong non-Islamist bases will be forced to tailor their message and policy goals in order to maintain their position.  For instance, Egyptian Islamists have long disparaged the peace accord with Israel, but it seems unlikely that, once running the country, they would choose to create a new enemy on their border by repudiating the deal. Such moderation will lead to further fractionalization of the movements and more amenable rulers.

Finally, it is doubtful whether the Islamist parties, particularly in their present manifestations, will be able to maintain significant popular support to dominate their respective countries. While they have historically been the most vocal and organized critics of the Arab regimes, the Arab Spring has largely been a secular movement.  In fact, the recent revolutions largely discredit the Islamist movement, which has failed over the past decades to achieve what these secular, youth movements have achieved over the past year.  The Arab Street does not want to shift from secular dictatorships to theocratic ones.  This partially explains the moderation of the Islamist movements but will also explain the inevitable rise of more secular parties.

None of this is to say that the next few years will be a time of peace and harmony in the Middle East.  Nor is it to suggest that the West's interests will always be paramount under these new regimes - new democracies will undoubtedly be fickle.  These new countries will not be younger, carbon-copies of the West but youthful and unique states that blend democratic institutions with experiences and expectations of the Arab and Muslim world.  Many policies may be anathema to America sentiments, for instance the treatment of women.  However, it is arguable that despite what a Western would call "missteps," most new democratic regimes will not be nearly as threatening as some fear.

In a sense, the un-repression of the Islamists will be their death knell.  Their ideology will be unable to withstand the open competition natural to democracy.  The superior systems of democracy and freedom will undoubtedly win the hearts and minds of the people, as the Islamists will be forced either to moderate or splinter off into smaller groups.  While this may not happen immediately and it is quite possible to have a seriously wrong turn in the short-run, over the long-run it is relatively clear that such an ideology cannot have a long-lasting hold.  One only need to look at the current struggles in Iran (and possibly soon to be second revolution) to understand this point.

The West would be wise to co-opt this to the best of their ability.  They should facilitate the removal of the current regimes, like Syria, to not only be perceived by the Arab masses as friends of freedom but to undercut the Islamist movements.  This will not only provide greater input and sway into the new regimes, but allow more Western-friendly parties to flourish.  Additionally, the West needs to exploit the inevitable divisions within Islamist movements, cultivating the most moderate and marginalizing the extremists.  While this will not ensure an immediate win on all fronts, it will guarantee the best possible long-term outcome for both the Middle East and the West.

[For two interesting articles that expand on these arguments see "The Rise of the Islamists" by Shadi Hamid  and "Terrorism After the Revolution" by Daniel Byman both published in May/June 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs.]

Can Muslims Beat the Islamists?

Andrew McCarthy sheds some interesting light on the ever-present debate over Islam and sharia.  In a well formulated editorial, McCarthy outlines the need for continued focus and discussion on sharia's interaction with the state and the tensions between secularism, moderate Islam, and Islamism (eg. radical Islam).  He argues that it is fair to critique radical interpretations of sharia in order to support moderate Muslim ideology.  He writes:

The hope, of course, is that between Muslim reformers who embrace our liberty culture, and the millions of Muslims who are peaceful, moderate people regardless of what their scriptures may literally command, alternative constructions of sharia will eventually discredit and marginalize the Islamist interpretation. It is a tough row to hoe.... But it is not impossible.

McCarthy develops his argument by poignantly, although admittedly imperfectly, contrasting modern Islam's trials to those experienced in the West's own history.  He outlines a few instances where the West had to move past strict interpretations of religion and reject the commingling of religion and state.

Government [in the US colonies] was based on God’s law, loyalty oaths were mandatory, Sabbath observance was strictly enforced, and brutal corporal punishments were carried out: Philip Radcliffe, for example, was whipped and had both ears cut off for “invectives against our church and government.” Others were executed, usually by hanging, for what, in effect, was the preaching of novel religious doctrines. 

Nor would we today recognize the original Virginia settlements as consonant with what we think of as our way of life. In Jamestown, too, religious duty blended seamlessly with civil law. We need not belabor the centrality of slavery to the developing agricultural economy. But for a time, a bachelor in Virginia was permitted to purchase a wife from among the young, unmarried women sent from England in order to make the colony more attractive. The price was 125 pounds of tobacco.

His conclusion is one of cautious optimism.  Islam has the ability to rise above the backwards, anti-liberal ways that are practiced in so many Muslim countries and preached by many fundamentalist scholars.  But this is only achievable if moderate Muslim voices join with those in the West to challenge and criticize the Islamist perspective.

It took a very long time to find the right balance between the sacred and the secular [in the West], and there is good reason to believe that our most serious problems today are caused by too much suppression of faith, not too little. But Islam has to be given a fair chance to strike this balance. We can’t tolerate jihadist atrocities, and we must fight Islamist efforts to erode our freedoms. But it will not do to smirk and say that Muslims have already had 14 centuries to get it together. How would we have done under that test? 

We have had to come a very long way to arrive at what we are rightly proud to call Western culture and American civil liberties. Our current battle is about preserving that inheritance for ourselves and making sure the Muslims in America who want it are free to have it. In factoring sharia into that battle, we need to be as humble as we are forceful.

A Marshall Plan for the Middle East: Part II: The New Vision

The followup to A Marshall Plan for the Middle East:  Part I:  An Old Approach Reborn is now available on FutureChallenges.  The second half, The New Vision, builds on the earlier call to reconcile Western security needs with democracy promotion in the Middle East.  It aims to begin a discussion on what specific forms a new Marshall Plan would take and outline some potential risks and concerns that Western architects should take into consideration before rushing into a new plan.

A Marshall Plan for the Middle East - Part I

My newest article, A Marshall Plan for the Middle East:  Part I, on FutureChallenges (a division of the Bertelsmann Foundation) discusses the need to develop a new approach to the current revolutionary fervor in the Middle East and North Africa.  Relying upon lessons from the Marshall Plan, the post-WWII plan to rehabilitate Europe and prevent the growth of communism, the article argues that the West must rely upon techniques to foster democracy in the Middle East in order to not only promote Western ideology but to strengthen Western security.  The frequent debate, within policy and journalist circles, between those who support democracy promotion (liberals) and those who support regime stability in order to maintain security (realists), is increasingly irrelevant - a product of an outmoded way of thinking.  The two goals are, particularly in the long-run, mutually inclusive.