The Arab Spring and the fall of Arab leaders, particularly US-allied dictators such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, have led to much consternation in many circles. While few would refute that the likes of Mubarak, Libya's Qaddafi, or Syria's al-Assad are genuinely good guys, some argue that the stability provided by these despots is preferable to the unknown vacuum that will result after their downfall. Particularly, it is argued, that with radical Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, waiting in the wings, these secular dictators are a safer bet for Western interests.
There is little doubt that another Iran (an Islamist led regime) would not bode well for US interests in the Middle East. Even Syria, the most anti-Western regime currently experiencing Arab Spring turmoil, could tilt further towards the Iranians. However, these fears are considerably overblown. There is much ground to believe that even if Islamist groups gain greater control in these countries that the outcome will be more benign than many doomsdayers predict.
First, it is far from clear that many Islamist groups want to control their governments. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, has disavowed any attempt to control the legislature and is running an incomplete slate of candidates. Arguably this is because many Islamists are concerned that the next general government will fail and thus feel it is best to be in opposition, not in control. Furthermore, many prefer to target the softer realms of government - welfare, religion, health services, etc. - and are not quite ready to take on the higher politics of foreign policy and economic affairs.
This later point dovetails with the second reason to avoid fear over the changes in the Middle East. The Islamists have, for decades, been a force of opposition. This is a relatively easy role to play, particularly when a country's leadership consists of dictators or military juntas. However, as Islamists step out from this role two trends will emerge. First, there will be growing divergence within the movement. As an opposition they could remain strong and united in saying "no;" as leaders they will invariably differ in how to proceed. [This may be another explanation for why the Islamist leadership is wary about taking full control of the government - they wish to get their base in line before power splits them apart.] Invariably such dissension will weaken the movement and undermine their ability to create serious harm.
The second trend to emerge will be that of moderation. Those who assume leadership positions in democracies with strong non-Islamist bases will be forced to tailor their message and policy goals in order to maintain their position. For instance, Egyptian Islamists have long disparaged the peace accord with Israel, but it seems unlikely that, once running the country, they would choose to create a new enemy on their border by repudiating the deal. Such moderation will lead to further fractionalization of the movements and more amenable rulers.
Finally, it is doubtful whether the Islamist parties, particularly in their present manifestations, will be able to maintain significant popular support to dominate their respective countries. While they have historically been the most vocal and organized critics of the Arab regimes, the Arab Spring has largely been a secular movement. In fact, the recent revolutions largely discredit the Islamist movement, which has failed over the past decades to achieve what these secular, youth movements have achieved over the past year. The Arab Street does not want to shift from secular dictatorships to theocratic ones. This partially explains the moderation of the Islamist movements but will also explain the inevitable rise of more secular parties.
None of this is to say that the next few years will be a time of peace and harmony in the Middle East. Nor is it to suggest that the West's interests will always be paramount under these new regimes - new democracies will undoubtedly be fickle. These new countries will not be younger, carbon-copies of the West but youthful and unique states that blend democratic institutions with experiences and expectations of the Arab and Muslim world. Many policies may be anathema to America sentiments, for instance the treatment of women. However, it is arguable that despite what a Western would call "missteps," most new democratic regimes will not be nearly as threatening as some fear.
In a sense, the un-repression of the Islamists will be their death knell. Their ideology will be unable to withstand the open competition natural to democracy. The superior systems of democracy and freedom will undoubtedly win the hearts and minds of the people, as the Islamists will be forced either to moderate or splinter off into smaller groups. While this may not happen immediately and it is quite possible to have a seriously wrong turn in the short-run, over the long-run it is relatively clear that such an ideology cannot have a long-lasting hold. One only need to look at the current struggles in Iran (and possibly soon to be second revolution) to understand this point.
The West would be wise to co-opt this to the best of their ability. They should facilitate the removal of the current regimes, like Syria, to not only be perceived by the Arab masses as friends of freedom but to undercut the Islamist movements. This will not only provide greater input and sway into the new regimes, but allow more Western-friendly parties to flourish. Additionally, the West needs to exploit the inevitable divisions within Islamist movements, cultivating the most moderate and marginalizing the extremists. While this will not ensure an immediate win on all fronts, it will guarantee the best possible long-term outcome for both the Middle East and the West.
[For two interesting articles that expand on these arguments see "The Rise of the Islamists" by Shadi Hamid and "Terrorism After the Revolution" by Daniel Byman both published in May/June 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs.]
Showing posts with label democracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label democracy. Show all posts
Saturday, September 3, 2011
Monday, March 28, 2011
A Marshall Plan for the Middle East: Part II: The New Vision
The followup to A Marshall Plan for the Middle East: Part I: An Old Approach Reborn is now available on FutureChallenges. The second half, The New Vision, builds on the earlier call to reconcile Western security needs with democracy promotion in the Middle East. It aims to begin a discussion on what specific forms a new Marshall Plan would take and outline some potential risks and concerns that Western architects should take into consideration before rushing into a new plan.
Thursday, February 3, 2011
Egypt Aflame
As Egypt descends into greater chaos, the United States is left in the awkward position that generally befalls great powers when their dictator friends are driven from power. The tension between realist foreign policy and liberal democracy promotion is never starker. Whether to support the faltering Mubarak regime or defend the revolutionary movement’s democratic principles is the question that commands the discussion and astoundingly, in our increasingly partisan climate, has no party loyalty.
The arguments criss-cross the political landscape. For instance, the Washington Post’s liberal commentator, Richard Cohen, has told the Obama administration to “just shut up.” One of Israel’s leading papers, Ha’aretz, criticizes the president claiming “Barack Obama will be remembered as the president who ‘lost’ Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt.” Alternatively, William Kristol, at the neoconservative Weekly Standard, urges Obama to do more to support the removal of the Egyptian leadership. Likewise, Francis Fukuyama argues that "liberals had better get organized" to build a new Egypt.
Understandably, the administration is cautious. The United States’ course of action could have severe implications for the fate of the region and American interests. However, a reluctance to place all bets on one side or the other is not the same as inaction. While in recent days the president has, after Mubarak effectively tendered his upcoming resignation (he will not run for reelection in September), come out in support of a peaceful transition, the administration has failed to develop a successful political stance that will allow the best possible result for Egypt and America’s interests. Instead, it largely remains on the sidelines, watching and waiting.
The tension between courses of action is clear. On the one hand, there is security in stability. Hosni Mubarak, for all his domestic flaws, is a known entity. He has been a reliable ally and supposedly kept the worst enemies – currently the Muslim Brotherhood – from dominating Egypt. (This is debatable as some argue that he has aided the Brotherhood’s cause in order to have a bogeyman that will maintain America’s support for his regime.) Since the most established political opposition consists of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, the fear is that Mubarak’s fall will lead to an Islamist state, reminiscent of the Iranian regime which overthrew the Shah in 1979 and remains in power today. Proponents of supporting Mubarak fear the worst outcome – replacing a friendly, undemocratic dictator with an unfriendly, (nominally) democratic, Islamist state.
This stands in sharp contrast to the principle of democracy-promotion, which emphasizes the spread of liberal values that so many Americans hold dear. These arguments, which come both from the left and the neocon right, argue that establishing true democracy is, in addition to being morally right, necessary for US security. From this perspective, steps should be taken to facilitate and aid the pro-democracy forces, allowing the dictatorship to be replaced with a system that will not only be democratic, but remain friendly to the West.
The US is thus stuck in an uncomfortable position. If it backs Mubarak, it will be accused of abandoning its principles and solidify its label as an enemy of the Egyptian people. If the current regime – with or without Mubarak – maintains power, the US will “win” in the short-run, yet inevitably rack-up indubitable costs to be paid when the regime ultimately falters. On the other hand, if despite US support for the regime, the revolution wins the fight, the Muslim Brotherhood will gather enough fodder to portray the clash as the West versus Islam, all but solidifying their ascent.
Conversely, if the administration completely abandons the Egyptian leadership, throwing its weight behind the revolution, it runs the risk of opening a Pandora’s Box of unknown consequences. The revolution could turn in favor of the Brotherhood or take a more Western-oriented path to democracy. Furthermore, such vocalized support from America could have a wider effect of destabilizing the regimes across the Middle East. The unknowns are incalculable and potential deadly.
So what is the administration to do? Certainly, it cannot, as Cohen argues, just sit on the sidelines and watch. Instead, it must do what it can to coax the best possible outcome, namely a liberal democracy, while minimizing the likelihood of the worst outcome, an Islamist state run by the Muslim Brotherhood. For better or worse, the middle outcome – a Western allied dictatorship – is no longer an option. Even if the current regime hangs on through this upheaval, it will only be a matter of time before the people rise again.
Practically, the administration needs to express the need for institutionalized democracy. The US (and Europe) must lend support to anyone within Egypt who desires to build democratic institutions. Institutions that provide checks and balances and diffusion of power must be established. This will give structure to an emerging democracy, put the US on the side of the people (as it should be), and limit the power of those non-democratic elements to exchange a Western-friendly dictatorship for an antagonistic dictatorship of Sharia. (To be clear, a government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, even if popularly elected would be no democracy. As Hamas’s election in the Gaza Strip clearly shows, a democracy is much more than simply voting.) While admittedly this path should have been taken years ago, it is not too late for the United States to show that it is willing to help the Egyptians achieve a system based on the noble principles which America represents.
The US need not come out for or against Mubarak. Nor should it back individuals or specific groups with the opposition. There does not need to be an Egyptian Nouri al-Maliki or Hamid Karzai; in fact it is probably better if such an individual does not exist. While Mohammad al-Baradei is weakly touted as the one to fill this role, the US would be wise not to cultivate the next leader of Egypt but to stand with the people and their desire for a new system. The focus should be on encouraging the construction of viable institutions that will lead to a stable democracy in whatever fashion the Egyptians choose to build such a system. The US's approach should not be about individuals or groups; we should not be picking winners or losers for the Egyptians, but about helping them convert the principles that we, and apparently they, value into living, breathing institutions.
Not only will this show the average Egyptian that the US does care about their plight, thus minimizing the rallying cry of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it will greatly contribute to the US’s security. While the transition may be scary, it is far better to have a democracy in Egypt than a dictatorship, which not only commits abuses but is prone to failure (as we are now seeing). The more the US fails to recognize that its security is better served by developing democracy, in a careful manner, the greater the likelihood is that it continues to bolster the very enemies which will one day seize power and stand in opposition to the West. Just as it is in America, power is vested in the people, whether they are temporarily stripped of it or not. By supporting their cause, we silence those who despise us, and achieve both the moral and the secure outcome.
Tranisitions to democracy always have risks and unknowns. It took the United States over 200 years to build its system and its work is not done. But these risks, in the long-run, are worth it. Where our democracy building has failed is in the top-down approach, rather than benevolent assistance at the grassroots in aiding the development of institutions. However, if we are honest with ourselves and the application of our principles, we need not fear a tradeoff between security and promotion of democracy. In fact they become intricately linked. Allowing Egypt to change its course, does not mean letting a revolution run rampant, but playing an active role in directing its flow. Damming up this energy, as was recently allowed to happen in Iran, will only hurt American interests in the end.
The arguments criss-cross the political landscape. For instance, the Washington Post’s liberal commentator, Richard Cohen, has told the Obama administration to “just shut up.” One of Israel’s leading papers, Ha’aretz, criticizes the president claiming “Barack Obama will be remembered as the president who ‘lost’ Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt.” Alternatively, William Kristol, at the neoconservative Weekly Standard, urges Obama to do more to support the removal of the Egyptian leadership. Likewise, Francis Fukuyama argues that "liberals had better get organized" to build a new Egypt.
Understandably, the administration is cautious. The United States’ course of action could have severe implications for the fate of the region and American interests. However, a reluctance to place all bets on one side or the other is not the same as inaction. While in recent days the president has, after Mubarak effectively tendered his upcoming resignation (he will not run for reelection in September), come out in support of a peaceful transition, the administration has failed to develop a successful political stance that will allow the best possible result for Egypt and America’s interests. Instead, it largely remains on the sidelines, watching and waiting.
The tension between courses of action is clear. On the one hand, there is security in stability. Hosni Mubarak, for all his domestic flaws, is a known entity. He has been a reliable ally and supposedly kept the worst enemies – currently the Muslim Brotherhood – from dominating Egypt. (This is debatable as some argue that he has aided the Brotherhood’s cause in order to have a bogeyman that will maintain America’s support for his regime.) Since the most established political opposition consists of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, the fear is that Mubarak’s fall will lead to an Islamist state, reminiscent of the Iranian regime which overthrew the Shah in 1979 and remains in power today. Proponents of supporting Mubarak fear the worst outcome – replacing a friendly, undemocratic dictator with an unfriendly, (nominally) democratic, Islamist state.
This stands in sharp contrast to the principle of democracy-promotion, which emphasizes the spread of liberal values that so many Americans hold dear. These arguments, which come both from the left and the neocon right, argue that establishing true democracy is, in addition to being morally right, necessary for US security. From this perspective, steps should be taken to facilitate and aid the pro-democracy forces, allowing the dictatorship to be replaced with a system that will not only be democratic, but remain friendly to the West.
The US is thus stuck in an uncomfortable position. If it backs Mubarak, it will be accused of abandoning its principles and solidify its label as an enemy of the Egyptian people. If the current regime – with or without Mubarak – maintains power, the US will “win” in the short-run, yet inevitably rack-up indubitable costs to be paid when the regime ultimately falters. On the other hand, if despite US support for the regime, the revolution wins the fight, the Muslim Brotherhood will gather enough fodder to portray the clash as the West versus Islam, all but solidifying their ascent.
Conversely, if the administration completely abandons the Egyptian leadership, throwing its weight behind the revolution, it runs the risk of opening a Pandora’s Box of unknown consequences. The revolution could turn in favor of the Brotherhood or take a more Western-oriented path to democracy. Furthermore, such vocalized support from America could have a wider effect of destabilizing the regimes across the Middle East. The unknowns are incalculable and potential deadly.
So what is the administration to do? Certainly, it cannot, as Cohen argues, just sit on the sidelines and watch. Instead, it must do what it can to coax the best possible outcome, namely a liberal democracy, while minimizing the likelihood of the worst outcome, an Islamist state run by the Muslim Brotherhood. For better or worse, the middle outcome – a Western allied dictatorship – is no longer an option. Even if the current regime hangs on through this upheaval, it will only be a matter of time before the people rise again.
Practically, the administration needs to express the need for institutionalized democracy. The US (and Europe) must lend support to anyone within Egypt who desires to build democratic institutions. Institutions that provide checks and balances and diffusion of power must be established. This will give structure to an emerging democracy, put the US on the side of the people (as it should be), and limit the power of those non-democratic elements to exchange a Western-friendly dictatorship for an antagonistic dictatorship of Sharia. (To be clear, a government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, even if popularly elected would be no democracy. As Hamas’s election in the Gaza Strip clearly shows, a democracy is much more than simply voting.) While admittedly this path should have been taken years ago, it is not too late for the United States to show that it is willing to help the Egyptians achieve a system based on the noble principles which America represents.
The US need not come out for or against Mubarak. Nor should it back individuals or specific groups with the opposition. There does not need to be an Egyptian Nouri al-Maliki or Hamid Karzai; in fact it is probably better if such an individual does not exist. While Mohammad al-Baradei is weakly touted as the one to fill this role, the US would be wise not to cultivate the next leader of Egypt but to stand with the people and their desire for a new system. The focus should be on encouraging the construction of viable institutions that will lead to a stable democracy in whatever fashion the Egyptians choose to build such a system. The US's approach should not be about individuals or groups; we should not be picking winners or losers for the Egyptians, but about helping them convert the principles that we, and apparently they, value into living, breathing institutions.
Not only will this show the average Egyptian that the US does care about their plight, thus minimizing the rallying cry of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it will greatly contribute to the US’s security. While the transition may be scary, it is far better to have a democracy in Egypt than a dictatorship, which not only commits abuses but is prone to failure (as we are now seeing). The more the US fails to recognize that its security is better served by developing democracy, in a careful manner, the greater the likelihood is that it continues to bolster the very enemies which will one day seize power and stand in opposition to the West. Just as it is in America, power is vested in the people, whether they are temporarily stripped of it or not. By supporting their cause, we silence those who despise us, and achieve both the moral and the secure outcome.
Tranisitions to democracy always have risks and unknowns. It took the United States over 200 years to build its system and its work is not done. But these risks, in the long-run, are worth it. Where our democracy building has failed is in the top-down approach, rather than benevolent assistance at the grassroots in aiding the development of institutions. However, if we are honest with ourselves and the application of our principles, we need not fear a tradeoff between security and promotion of democracy. In fact they become intricately linked. Allowing Egypt to change its course, does not mean letting a revolution run rampant, but playing an active role in directing its flow. Damming up this energy, as was recently allowed to happen in Iran, will only hurt American interests in the end.
Monday, January 31, 2011
The Fate of Mubarak
Stephen J. Hadley, former national security advisor to George W. Bush, writes in today's Wall Street Journal about the possible fate of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Given the intense political upheaval in Egypt, Hadley sees Mubarak ending up a lame-duck president until presidential elections in September (where it is, in his opinion, unlikely that Mubarak will run again) or alternatively, the army replaces Mubarak to allow for a transition to open democracy. He provides an interesting argument and it is a worthy read.
Any outcome of the Egyptian protest entails the risk of a seizure of power by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood - an outcome that would be bad for Egyptian democracy and US and regional interests. The eternal struggle between stability and transition to democracy is starkly clear, as the US is in an awfully difficult position. The best course of action is for the US government to announce its support for greater democracy, regardless of what parties bring it about. This puts the US on the side of the pro-democracy protesters, while limiting the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, without cutting Mubarak loose, affording him the opportunity to at least attempt to make true reforms from within. Regardless of the outcome, it ensures a greater likelihood of committed democratic reform, while minimizing the destabilizing costs of an unknown and possibly Islamist "freedom" movement.
Any outcome of the Egyptian protest entails the risk of a seizure of power by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood - an outcome that would be bad for Egyptian democracy and US and regional interests. The eternal struggle between stability and transition to democracy is starkly clear, as the US is in an awfully difficult position. The best course of action is for the US government to announce its support for greater democracy, regardless of what parties bring it about. This puts the US on the side of the pro-democracy protesters, while limiting the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, without cutting Mubarak loose, affording him the opportunity to at least attempt to make true reforms from within. Regardless of the outcome, it ensures a greater likelihood of committed democratic reform, while minimizing the destabilizing costs of an unknown and possibly Islamist "freedom" movement.
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
Is Obama an Idealist?
What is Obama's foreign policy? The Washington Post's Fred Hiatt asks this in a recent editorial. As Hiatt points out, Obama has recently increased his pro-democracy rhetoric; however this stands in contrast to Obama's historical approach to foreign policy. After an early start of kowtowing to foreign powers, a refusal to work with the revolutionary movement against the Iranian regime, and an increase in relations with tyrannical regimes, it is surprising to see democracy promotion coming from the White House. It seems unlikely this is the result of a hidden idealism, particularly in light of Obama's (inept) realist approach. Unfortunately, it is most likely nothing more than empty rhetoric - a bone tossed to the democracy promoters in his base.
Saturday, March 6, 2010
Putting the Con in Reconciliation
With Obama’s latest audacious push on healthcare, it looks increasingly likely that the Senate will turn to the parliamentary tool of reconciliation. The procedure, which is narrowly targeted at budgetary issues, provides for a method to avoid the Senate filibuster. Reconciliation has been used in the past, but in all cases for narrow budget-related issues. Democrats Senate leaders’ intention seems to be to ram through as much of an unpopular health care bill as procedure will allow.
Democrats argue that reconciliation needs to be used to overcome the obstinacy of the Republicans. They accuse the Republicans of hindering “real progress” in the name of politics, which was aided by Scott Brown’s win in Massachusetts. However, this is nothing but a straw man. Republicans are only able to use the filibuster and prevent a final vote because their constituents do not support the healthcare bill. The fact of the matter is that it would be political suicide for the Republicans, or any party for that matter, to obstruct legislation simply to ‘stick-it’ to the majority party.
The filibuster is a tool that was designed to limit the power of the majority party in the Senate. In some ways this is inherently undemocratic (and more republican) in terms of institutional structure. However, in other ways it is precisely democratic. As is being shown today, the people’s representatives do not always vote in line with their constituencies’ wishes. Rasmussen’s most recent poll shows that 52% of voters oppose the current package. When ideology steps in the way of responsibility to the voters, the filibuster can serve as a useful check on anti-democratic tendencies.
This clearly explains Republican behavior; namely that they understand the people do not want Obama’s healthcare package. In Republican hands, the filibuster has become a democratic tool waged against the Obama-Reid-Pelosi triumvirate of leftist policies. Republicans would not take such a political risk if they did not believe that the people supported such behavior. As Obama recently pointed out, the voters will decide in November whether these actions are supported.
Additionally, the Republican ‘obstruction’ is a direct result of ideological differences. There is a deep divide between the socialist, European model of the Democrats and the capitalist approach of the Republicans. The Republicans did an outstanding job portraying this at the theatrical Healthcare Summit. Americans are also beginning to realize that there are other options to reform to the Democratic orthodoxy.
Because of these two factors, Republicans have been able to halt the passage of a radical bill that, given the political landscape a year ago, should have been an easy win for the Democrats. The Democrats’ failure was only facilitated by their inability to not hammer out a proposal amongst their supermajority before America realized the ideological flaws on the Left.
However, rather than recognizing this, Team-O is pushing forward at full steam. Their desire to use reconciliation shows not only desperation but a complete disdain for America. It would also be an unprecedented abuse of power as The Wall Street Journal recently opined on. Reconciliation has historically been used on narrow terms and with cross-aisle support.
Democrats argue that reconciliation needs to be used to overcome the obstinacy of the Republicans. They accuse the Republicans of hindering “real progress” in the name of politics, which was aided by Scott Brown’s win in Massachusetts. However, this is nothing but a straw man. Republicans are only able to use the filibuster and prevent a final vote because their constituents do not support the healthcare bill. The fact of the matter is that it would be political suicide for the Republicans, or any party for that matter, to obstruct legislation simply to ‘stick-it’ to the majority party.
The filibuster is a tool that was designed to limit the power of the majority party in the Senate. In some ways this is inherently undemocratic (and more republican) in terms of institutional structure. However, in other ways it is precisely democratic. As is being shown today, the people’s representatives do not always vote in line with their constituencies’ wishes. Rasmussen’s most recent poll shows that 52% of voters oppose the current package. When ideology steps in the way of responsibility to the voters, the filibuster can serve as a useful check on anti-democratic tendencies.
This clearly explains Republican behavior; namely that they understand the people do not want Obama’s healthcare package. In Republican hands, the filibuster has become a democratic tool waged against the Obama-Reid-Pelosi triumvirate of leftist policies. Republicans would not take such a political risk if they did not believe that the people supported such behavior. As Obama recently pointed out, the voters will decide in November whether these actions are supported.
Additionally, the Republican ‘obstruction’ is a direct result of ideological differences. There is a deep divide between the socialist, European model of the Democrats and the capitalist approach of the Republicans. The Republicans did an outstanding job portraying this at the theatrical Healthcare Summit. Americans are also beginning to realize that there are other options to reform to the Democratic orthodoxy.
Because of these two factors, Republicans have been able to halt the passage of a radical bill that, given the political landscape a year ago, should have been an easy win for the Democrats. The Democrats’ failure was only facilitated by their inability to not hammer out a proposal amongst their supermajority before America realized the ideological flaws on the Left.
However, rather than recognizing this, Team-O is pushing forward at full steam. Their desire to use reconciliation shows not only desperation but a complete disdain for America. It would also be an unprecedented abuse of power as The Wall Street Journal recently opined on. Reconciliation has historically been used on narrow terms and with cross-aisle support.
Democrats often point to welfare reform in 1996 as a reconciliation precedent, yet that bill passed the Senate with 78 votes, including Joe Biden and half of the Democratic caucus. The children's health insurance program in 1997 was steered through Congress with reconciliation, but it, too, was built on strong (if misguided) bipartisan support. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that created Schip passed 85-15, including 43 Republicans. Even President Bush's 2001 tax cuts, another case in reconciliation point, were endorsed by 12 Senate Democrats.The terrifying arrogance of the Left’s leadership is politically unwise. The Democrats will undoubtedly discover this at the polls in November. However, it is also potentially damaging to America. A passage of this bill will have disastrous effects on the healthcare industry, while solving few of the outstanding problems. Even worse, it will encourage further abuse of the parliamentary system for partisan ideological gain.
Tuesday, June 30, 2009
Does a Teetering Iran Vindicate the Iraq War? - A Middle Eastern Domino Theory
The recent protests in Iran have added some cracks to the otherwise stable foundation of the Iranian Islamist regime. While the government is still overwhelmingly strong, the democracy movement has the ability to drastically change the political dynamics in the Middle East. Although far from a sure bet, the new Iranian revolution may very well be the second step in a modern day, Middle Eastern ‘domino theory’- preceded by the War in Iraq.
One of the more vocal criticisms of regime change in Iraq was that it unbalanced the region. Iraq kept Iran in line. By removing the Iraqi threat Iran was unleashed. However, as Robert Kaplan points out in a recent Washington Post editorial, this may have been part of the plan. (See here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/23/AR2009062303114.html?wpisrc=newsletter.) In the short-run, a rise in Iranian power is less than desirous; however, it may inevitably let loose a path to real change in the Middle East.
Because of the removal of the Iraqi threat, Iran made a grab for greater regional and international power. The regime was better able to flex its muscle and meddle in regional and foreign affairs without having to be preoccupied with its Western border. This led Iran to directly challenge America and Europe.
Iran’s power move, while seemingly bad for America, had two main effects. First, it caused rebalancing amongst the Arab states. The ‘moderate’ Sunni Arab states of Egypt and Saudi Arabia were now faced with a more imminent danger from Iran. Today, these two states now face numerous new threats to their rule, both domestically and regionally, from an unencumbered Iran. With one foe out of the picture, Iran can increase its focus on these remaining two contenders for regional hegemony. With an increase in Iranian-sponsored terrorism and a direct threat of an Iranian nuclear bomb, it is only natural that the various Sunni Arab states would need to join forces against the upstart Iran. This is beneficial because it pushes these countries closer to the United States, and enables greater strength and flexibility in the region.
Second, Iran’s excessive aggression promoted a pro-democracy movement. The Iranian revolution was born of disgust with the ruling clerics. Amongst the chief complaints, was Ahmadinejad’s bellicose language and antagonism of the West. While certainly not the only cause for revolution, the Iranian leadership’s aggression was a spark that helped incite the powder keg. The moderate reformers were unwilling to see an extremist such as Ahmadinejad lead their country into direct conflict with the U.S. It is unlikely that Ahmadinejad would have been as aggressive, and therefore as repulsive to his people, had Saddam Hussein still been in power.
One possible, fortunate outcome would be a spread of pro-democracy movements throughout the Middle East. As the Arab Street watches the tumult in Iran, it is natural to question the leadership of the remaining Arab despots. While no large movements have started yet, there is considerable talk in the Middle East about the need for reform. Kindred spirits in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are realizing that they can fight for greater rights and freedoms and throw off the yokes of their respective regimes. Lebanon, for instance, has already rejected the Islamist movement of Hezbollah and turned towards the West.
To what extent the Iranian revolution spreads throughout the Middle East is still very much up in the air. The extent of the Iranian reformists’ success is, of course, a huge factor. The repressive measures of the Arab regimes will also play a role. Likewise, reform could come in many shapes- from wholesale regime change to more gradual, internal policy changes. However, this is a profound opportunity for real change in the region- change that has the chance of drastically altering global politics.
One of the more vocal criticisms of regime change in Iraq was that it unbalanced the region. Iraq kept Iran in line. By removing the Iraqi threat Iran was unleashed. However, as Robert Kaplan points out in a recent Washington Post editorial, this may have been part of the plan. (See here: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/23/AR2009062303114.html?wpisrc=newsletter.) In the short-run, a rise in Iranian power is less than desirous; however, it may inevitably let loose a path to real change in the Middle East.
Because of the removal of the Iraqi threat, Iran made a grab for greater regional and international power. The regime was better able to flex its muscle and meddle in regional and foreign affairs without having to be preoccupied with its Western border. This led Iran to directly challenge America and Europe.
Iran’s power move, while seemingly bad for America, had two main effects. First, it caused rebalancing amongst the Arab states. The ‘moderate’ Sunni Arab states of Egypt and Saudi Arabia were now faced with a more imminent danger from Iran. Today, these two states now face numerous new threats to their rule, both domestically and regionally, from an unencumbered Iran. With one foe out of the picture, Iran can increase its focus on these remaining two contenders for regional hegemony. With an increase in Iranian-sponsored terrorism and a direct threat of an Iranian nuclear bomb, it is only natural that the various Sunni Arab states would need to join forces against the upstart Iran. This is beneficial because it pushes these countries closer to the United States, and enables greater strength and flexibility in the region.
Second, Iran’s excessive aggression promoted a pro-democracy movement. The Iranian revolution was born of disgust with the ruling clerics. Amongst the chief complaints, was Ahmadinejad’s bellicose language and antagonism of the West. While certainly not the only cause for revolution, the Iranian leadership’s aggression was a spark that helped incite the powder keg. The moderate reformers were unwilling to see an extremist such as Ahmadinejad lead their country into direct conflict with the U.S. It is unlikely that Ahmadinejad would have been as aggressive, and therefore as repulsive to his people, had Saddam Hussein still been in power.
One possible, fortunate outcome would be a spread of pro-democracy movements throughout the Middle East. As the Arab Street watches the tumult in Iran, it is natural to question the leadership of the remaining Arab despots. While no large movements have started yet, there is considerable talk in the Middle East about the need for reform. Kindred spirits in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria are realizing that they can fight for greater rights and freedoms and throw off the yokes of their respective regimes. Lebanon, for instance, has already rejected the Islamist movement of Hezbollah and turned towards the West.
To what extent the Iranian revolution spreads throughout the Middle East is still very much up in the air. The extent of the Iranian reformists’ success is, of course, a huge factor. The repressive measures of the Arab regimes will also play a role. Likewise, reform could come in many shapes- from wholesale regime change to more gradual, internal policy changes. However, this is a profound opportunity for real change in the region- change that has the chance of drastically altering global politics.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
Iran and Ahmadinejad Are Stumbling. Obama, Time to Step Up!
As the protests continue in Iran, President Obama is unsurprisingly mum. With domestic turmoil unlike any seen since 1979, the Iranian reformists are showing their displeasure with the iron-fisted theocracy and its stooge Ahmadinejad. The momentous rebellion (soon to be revolution?) is perfectly poised to bring about real change in one of the biggest threats to American security.
As Robert Kagan eloquently points out in the Washington Post (See here http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/16/AR2009061601753.html?wpisrc=newsletter&wpisrc=newsletter&wpisrc=newsletter) , Obama is acting in a pure realist fashion. His stated goal is to dialogue with Iran. Any behavior that annoys or upsets the current leaders of Iran is supposedly detrimental to Obama’s aims. So he chooses to remain relatively quiet about the gross abuses. Obama sides with the enemy because he wants to leave avenues open to dialogue when the protests flare out. This of course assumes that whatever happens in the short-run, the Iranian leadership will remain in power in the long-run.
He buttresses this by claiming to take the high ground. America does not want to meddle in Iranian affairs is his message. He states, “the easiest way for reactionary forces inside Iran to crush reformers is to say it’s the U.S. that is encouraging those reformers…. What I’ve said is, look, it’s up to the Iranian people to make a decision….We are not meddling.” This argument essentially assumes that reformist Iranians will be thwarted if they perceive the Americans as controlling and dictating the movement.
This, to some degree, may be true. However, the argument misses an important subtlety. The US is often criticized when it ‘helps’, but it is also criticized when it fails to help. The fact of the matter is, it is not about whether the US helps or not, but how it helps. There is a whole spectrum of actions the US government can take to show support and give assistance without leading the charge. A simple show of solidarity by outwardly condemning the Iranian election abuses would go far to strengthen the moral of the Iranian reformists. Any freedom loving individual would find much strength in hearing his fight recognized and legitimated. Beyond that, the US can offer political pressure on Iran and assistance in enabling the Iranian protestors to get their voices heard above the government censorship.
Any action in favor of the protestors can and will be used by Ahmadinejad to drum up anti-Americanism. The strategy is undeniably successful with parts of the Arab and Persian worlds. An America portrayed as colonial and imperialist, meddling in Iranian affairs can raise deep-seeded emotions. However, as he has shown, Ahmadinejad does not need America to do anything to use this tactic. The Iranian despot is already blaming the US for instigating the protest (See MSNBC: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31380861/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa). If the bankruptcy of Obama’s Iranian policy wasn’t already clear, this puts the final nail in the coffin. Why bother trying to avoid meddling, if you are accused of it anyway?
The fact of the matter is, that the US has a huge potential to do a lot of good, and Obama is squandering it. John McCain and many others recognize this and are calling for more action. Obama seems so blindly obsessed with being the anti-Bush and pursuing his ‘talking’ policy that he is failing to see what is right before his nose. The Iranian regime is teetering; freedom needs a gentle push from America.
As Robert Kagan eloquently points out in the Washington Post (See here http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/16/AR2009061601753.html?wpisrc=newsletter&wpisrc=newsletter&wpisrc=newsletter) , Obama is acting in a pure realist fashion. His stated goal is to dialogue with Iran. Any behavior that annoys or upsets the current leaders of Iran is supposedly detrimental to Obama’s aims. So he chooses to remain relatively quiet about the gross abuses. Obama sides with the enemy because he wants to leave avenues open to dialogue when the protests flare out. This of course assumes that whatever happens in the short-run, the Iranian leadership will remain in power in the long-run.
He buttresses this by claiming to take the high ground. America does not want to meddle in Iranian affairs is his message. He states, “the easiest way for reactionary forces inside Iran to crush reformers is to say it’s the U.S. that is encouraging those reformers…. What I’ve said is, look, it’s up to the Iranian people to make a decision….We are not meddling.” This argument essentially assumes that reformist Iranians will be thwarted if they perceive the Americans as controlling and dictating the movement.
This, to some degree, may be true. However, the argument misses an important subtlety. The US is often criticized when it ‘helps’, but it is also criticized when it fails to help. The fact of the matter is, it is not about whether the US helps or not, but how it helps. There is a whole spectrum of actions the US government can take to show support and give assistance without leading the charge. A simple show of solidarity by outwardly condemning the Iranian election abuses would go far to strengthen the moral of the Iranian reformists. Any freedom loving individual would find much strength in hearing his fight recognized and legitimated. Beyond that, the US can offer political pressure on Iran and assistance in enabling the Iranian protestors to get their voices heard above the government censorship.
Any action in favor of the protestors can and will be used by Ahmadinejad to drum up anti-Americanism. The strategy is undeniably successful with parts of the Arab and Persian worlds. An America portrayed as colonial and imperialist, meddling in Iranian affairs can raise deep-seeded emotions. However, as he has shown, Ahmadinejad does not need America to do anything to use this tactic. The Iranian despot is already blaming the US for instigating the protest (See MSNBC: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31380861/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa). If the bankruptcy of Obama’s Iranian policy wasn’t already clear, this puts the final nail in the coffin. Why bother trying to avoid meddling, if you are accused of it anyway?
The fact of the matter is, that the US has a huge potential to do a lot of good, and Obama is squandering it. John McCain and many others recognize this and are calling for more action. Obama seems so blindly obsessed with being the anti-Bush and pursuing his ‘talking’ policy that he is failing to see what is right before his nose. The Iranian regime is teetering; freedom needs a gentle push from America.
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