Egypt's Protesters Destroying Peace with Israel

Egyptian protesters are squandering their newly found independence as they turn to violence instead of peacefully trying to build a free democracy. On Friday, protesters attacked the Israeli embassy, tearing down a concrete wall and looting the building.

Israeli quickly had to evacuate their personnel, except for the deputy ambassador.  According to reports, police did little to stop the rioting, although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu credits the Egyptian authorities with assisting in the evacuation of Israeli citizens.  Netanyahu was quoted saying:

The fact that the Egyptian authorities acted with determination and rescued our people should be noted and we extend them our thanks.... However, Egypt must not ignore the severe injury to the fabric of peace with Israel and such a blatant violation of international norms.

The Egyptian street should be very careful to avoid turning their rage towards the Israeli government, while the Egyptian authorities should do everything in their power to quell such rioting and destructive behavior.  It is in everyone's interest to maintain a robust peace between the two neighboring states.  No one, save the fundamentalist Islamists, will benefit from renewed strife between Egypt and Israel.

While it is unlikely for the relationship to quickly terminate in the near future, this is the second major instance in a month where Egypt's new government has failed to prevent attacks directed at Israel.  This is a worrisome trend, demonstrating not only that the Egyptians do not fully control their territory but also putting unnecessary strain between two of the region's most powerful states.  Peace between Egypt and Israel is essential for continued stability in the Middle East.

Don't Fear the Islamists

The Arab Spring and the fall of Arab leaders, particularly US-allied dictators such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, have led to much consternation in many circles.  While few would refute that the likes of Mubarak, Libya's Qaddafi, or Syria's al-Assad are genuinely good guys, some argue that the stability provided by these despots is preferable to the unknown vacuum that will result after their downfall.  Particularly, it is argued, that with radical Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, waiting in the wings, these secular dictators are a safer bet for Western interests.

There is little doubt that another Iran (an Islamist led regime) would not bode well for US interests in the Middle East.  Even Syria, the most anti-Western regime currently experiencing Arab Spring turmoil, could tilt further towards the Iranians.  However, these fears are considerably overblown.  There is much ground to believe that even if Islamist groups gain greater control in these countries that the outcome will be more benign than many doomsdayers predict.

First, it is far from clear that many Islamist groups want to control their governments.  Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, has disavowed any attempt to control the legislature and is running an incomplete slate of candidates.  Arguably this is because many Islamists are concerned that the next general government will fail and thus feel it is best to be in opposition, not in control.  Furthermore, many prefer to target the softer realms of government - welfare, religion, health services, etc. - and are not quite ready to take on the higher politics of foreign policy and economic affairs.

This later point dovetails with the second reason to avoid fear over the changes in the Middle East.  The Islamists have, for decades, been a force of opposition.  This is a relatively easy role to play, particularly when a country's leadership consists of dictators or military juntas.  However, as Islamists step out from this role two trends will emerge.  First, there will be growing divergence within the movement.  As an opposition they could remain strong and united in saying "no;" as leaders they will invariably differ in how to proceed. [This may be another explanation for why the Islamist leadership is wary about taking full control of the government - they wish to get their base in line before power splits them apart.]  Invariably such dissension will weaken the movement and undermine their ability to create serious harm.

The second trend to emerge will be that of moderation.  Those who assume leadership positions in democracies with strong non-Islamist bases will be forced to tailor their message and policy goals in order to maintain their position.  For instance, Egyptian Islamists have long disparaged the peace accord with Israel, but it seems unlikely that, once running the country, they would choose to create a new enemy on their border by repudiating the deal. Such moderation will lead to further fractionalization of the movements and more amenable rulers.

Finally, it is doubtful whether the Islamist parties, particularly in their present manifestations, will be able to maintain significant popular support to dominate their respective countries. While they have historically been the most vocal and organized critics of the Arab regimes, the Arab Spring has largely been a secular movement.  In fact, the recent revolutions largely discredit the Islamist movement, which has failed over the past decades to achieve what these secular, youth movements have achieved over the past year.  The Arab Street does not want to shift from secular dictatorships to theocratic ones.  This partially explains the moderation of the Islamist movements but will also explain the inevitable rise of more secular parties.

None of this is to say that the next few years will be a time of peace and harmony in the Middle East.  Nor is it to suggest that the West's interests will always be paramount under these new regimes - new democracies will undoubtedly be fickle.  These new countries will not be younger, carbon-copies of the West but youthful and unique states that blend democratic institutions with experiences and expectations of the Arab and Muslim world.  Many policies may be anathema to America sentiments, for instance the treatment of women.  However, it is arguable that despite what a Western would call "missteps," most new democratic regimes will not be nearly as threatening as some fear.

In a sense, the un-repression of the Islamists will be their death knell.  Their ideology will be unable to withstand the open competition natural to democracy.  The superior systems of democracy and freedom will undoubtedly win the hearts and minds of the people, as the Islamists will be forced either to moderate or splinter off into smaller groups.  While this may not happen immediately and it is quite possible to have a seriously wrong turn in the short-run, over the long-run it is relatively clear that such an ideology cannot have a long-lasting hold.  One only need to look at the current struggles in Iran (and possibly soon to be second revolution) to understand this point.

The West would be wise to co-opt this to the best of their ability.  They should facilitate the removal of the current regimes, like Syria, to not only be perceived by the Arab masses as friends of freedom but to undercut the Islamist movements.  This will not only provide greater input and sway into the new regimes, but allow more Western-friendly parties to flourish.  Additionally, the West needs to exploit the inevitable divisions within Islamist movements, cultivating the most moderate and marginalizing the extremists.  While this will not ensure an immediate win on all fronts, it will guarantee the best possible long-term outcome for both the Middle East and the West.

[For two interesting articles that expand on these arguments see "The Rise of the Islamists" by Shadi Hamid  and "Terrorism After the Revolution" by Daniel Byman both published in May/June 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs.]

The Weekend Interview with Wolfowitz

This week's Weekend Interview in the Wall Street Journal is an interesting and recommended read.  The WSJ sits down with Paul Wolfowitz, often deemed one of the architects of the Iraq War and the neocon movement.  Wolfowitz discusses his thoughts on bin Laden, the Arab Spring, Iran, and Iraq.  While at times critical of Obama - who had opposed Wolfowitz from his pre-presidential days - Wolfowitz is quite even-handed and provides insightful analysis on the Middle East.  Most interesting is that he demurs on crediting the Iraq War for sparking the Arab Spring, arguing that "I think Iraq took so long and was so bloody and is still so uncertain that it would be hard to say that it has inspired people."

Egypt Aflame

As Egypt descends into greater chaos, the United States is left in the awkward position that generally befalls great powers when their dictator friends are driven from power. The tension between realist foreign policy and liberal democracy promotion is never starker. Whether to support the faltering Mubarak regime or defend the revolutionary movement’s democratic principles is the question that commands the discussion and astoundingly, in our increasingly partisan climate, has no party loyalty.

The arguments criss-cross the political landscape. For instance, the Washington Post’s liberal commentator, Richard Cohen, has told the Obama administration to “just shut up.” One of Israel’s leading papers, Ha’aretz, criticizes the president claiming “Barack Obama will be remembered as the president who ‘lost’ Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt.” Alternatively, William Kristol, at the neoconservative Weekly Standard, urges Obama to do more to support the removal of the Egyptian leadership.  Likewise, Francis Fukuyama argues that "liberals had better get organized" to build a new Egypt.

Understandably, the administration is cautious. The United States’ course of action could have severe implications for the fate of the region and American interests. However, a reluctance to place all bets on one side or the other is not the same as inaction. While in recent days the president has, after Mubarak effectively tendered his upcoming resignation (he will not run for reelection in September), come out in support of a peaceful transition, the administration has failed to develop a successful political stance that will allow the best possible result for Egypt and America’s interests.  Instead, it largely remains on the sidelines, watching and waiting.

The tension between courses of action is clear. On the one hand, there is security in stability. Hosni Mubarak, for all his domestic flaws, is a known entity. He has been a reliable ally and supposedly kept the worst enemies – currently the Muslim Brotherhood – from dominating Egypt. (This is debatable as some argue that he has aided the Brotherhood’s cause in order to have a bogeyman that will maintain America’s support for his regime.) Since the most established political opposition consists of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, the fear is that Mubarak’s fall will lead to an Islamist state, reminiscent of the Iranian regime which overthrew the Shah in 1979 and remains in power today. Proponents of supporting Mubarak fear the worst outcome – replacing a friendly, undemocratic dictator with an unfriendly, (nominally) democratic, Islamist state.

This stands in sharp contrast to the principle of democracy-promotion, which emphasizes the spread of liberal values that so many Americans hold dear. These arguments, which come both from the left and the neocon right, argue that establishing true democracy is, in addition to being morally right, necessary for US security. From this perspective, steps should be taken to facilitate and aid the pro-democracy forces, allowing the dictatorship to be replaced with a system that will not only be democratic, but remain friendly to the West.

The US is thus stuck in an uncomfortable position. If it backs Mubarak, it will be accused of abandoning its principles and solidify its label as an enemy of the Egyptian people. If the current regime – with or without Mubarak – maintains power, the US will “win” in the short-run, yet inevitably rack-up indubitable costs to be paid when the regime ultimately falters. On the other hand, if despite US support for the regime, the revolution wins the fight, the Muslim Brotherhood will gather enough fodder to portray the clash as the West versus Islam, all but solidifying their ascent.

Conversely, if the administration completely abandons the Egyptian leadership, throwing its weight behind the revolution, it runs the risk of opening a Pandora’s Box of unknown consequences. The revolution could turn in favor of the Brotherhood or take a more Western-oriented path to democracy. Furthermore, such vocalized support from America could have a wider effect of destabilizing the regimes across the Middle East. The unknowns are incalculable and potential deadly.

So what is the administration to do? Certainly, it cannot, as Cohen argues, just sit on the sidelines and watch. Instead, it must do what it can to coax the best possible outcome, namely a liberal democracy, while minimizing the likelihood of the worst outcome, an Islamist state run by the Muslim Brotherhood. For better or worse, the middle outcome – a Western allied dictatorship – is no longer an option. Even if the current regime hangs on through this upheaval, it will only be a matter of time before the people rise again.

Practically, the administration needs to express the need for institutionalized democracy. The US (and Europe) must lend support to anyone within Egypt who desires to build democratic institutions. Institutions that provide checks and balances and diffusion of power must be established. This will give structure to an emerging democracy, put the US on the side of the people (as it should be), and limit the power of those non-democratic elements to exchange a Western-friendly dictatorship for an antagonistic dictatorship of Sharia. (To be clear, a government controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, even if popularly elected would be no democracy. As Hamas’s election in the Gaza Strip clearly shows, a democracy is much more than simply voting.) While admittedly this path should have been taken years ago, it is not too late for the United States to show that it is willing to help the Egyptians achieve a system based on the noble principles which America represents.

The US need not come out for or against Mubarak. Nor should it back individuals or specific groups with the opposition. There does not need to be an Egyptian Nouri al-Maliki or Hamid Karzai; in fact it is probably better if such an individual does not exist. While Mohammad al-Baradei is weakly touted as the one to fill this role, the US would be wise not to cultivate the next leader of Egypt but to stand with the people and their desire for a new system. The focus should be on encouraging the construction of viable institutions that will lead to a stable democracy in whatever fashion the Egyptians choose to build such a system. The US's approach should not be about individuals or groups; we should not be picking winners or losers for the Egyptians, but about helping them convert the principles that we, and apparently they, value into living, breathing institutions.

Not only will this show the average Egyptian that the US does care about their plight, thus minimizing the rallying cry of the Muslim Brotherhood, but it will greatly contribute to the US’s security. While the transition may be scary, it is far better to have a democracy in Egypt than a dictatorship, which not only commits abuses but is prone to failure (as we are now seeing). The more the US fails to recognize that its security is better served by developing democracy, in a careful manner, the greater the likelihood is that it continues to bolster the very enemies which will one day seize power and stand in opposition to the West. Just as it is in America, power is vested in the people, whether they are temporarily stripped of it or not. By supporting their cause, we silence those who despise us, and achieve both the moral and the secure outcome.

Tranisitions to democracy always have risks and unknowns. It took the United States over 200 years to build its system and its work is not done. But these risks, in the long-run, are worth it. Where our democracy building has failed is in the top-down approach, rather than benevolent assistance at the grassroots in aiding the development of institutions. However, if we are honest with ourselves and the application of our principles, we need not fear a tradeoff between security and promotion of democracy. In fact they become intricately linked. Allowing Egypt to change its course, does not mean letting a revolution run rampant, but playing an active role in directing its flow. Damming up this energy, as was recently allowed to happen in Iran, will only hurt American interests in the end.

The Fate of Mubarak

Stephen J. Hadley, former national security advisor to George W. Bush, writes in today's Wall Street Journal about the possible fate of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.  Given the intense political upheaval in Egypt, Hadley sees Mubarak ending up a lame-duck president until presidential elections in September (where it is, in his opinion, unlikely that Mubarak will run again) or alternatively, the army replaces Mubarak to allow for a transition to open democracy.  He provides an interesting argument and it is a worthy read.

Any outcome of the Egyptian protest entails the risk of a seizure of power by the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood - an outcome that would be bad for Egyptian democracy and US and regional interests.  The eternal struggle between stability and transition to democracy is starkly clear, as the US is in an awfully difficult position.  The best course of action is for the US government to announce its support for greater democracy, regardless of what parties bring it about.  This puts the US on the side of the pro-democracy protesters, while limiting the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, without cutting Mubarak loose, affording him the opportunity to at least attempt to make true reforms from within.  Regardless of the outcome, it ensures a greater likelihood of committed democratic reform, while minimizing the destabilizing costs of an unknown and possibly Islamist "freedom" movement.