Don't Fear the Islamists

The Arab Spring and the fall of Arab leaders, particularly US-allied dictators such as Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, have led to much consternation in many circles.  While few would refute that the likes of Mubarak, Libya's Qaddafi, or Syria's al-Assad are genuinely good guys, some argue that the stability provided by these despots is preferable to the unknown vacuum that will result after their downfall.  Particularly, it is argued, that with radical Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists, waiting in the wings, these secular dictators are a safer bet for Western interests.

There is little doubt that another Iran (an Islamist led regime) would not bode well for US interests in the Middle East.  Even Syria, the most anti-Western regime currently experiencing Arab Spring turmoil, could tilt further towards the Iranians.  However, these fears are considerably overblown.  There is much ground to believe that even if Islamist groups gain greater control in these countries that the outcome will be more benign than many doomsdayers predict.

First, it is far from clear that many Islamist groups want to control their governments.  Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, has disavowed any attempt to control the legislature and is running an incomplete slate of candidates.  Arguably this is because many Islamists are concerned that the next general government will fail and thus feel it is best to be in opposition, not in control.  Furthermore, many prefer to target the softer realms of government - welfare, religion, health services, etc. - and are not quite ready to take on the higher politics of foreign policy and economic affairs.

This later point dovetails with the second reason to avoid fear over the changes in the Middle East.  The Islamists have, for decades, been a force of opposition.  This is a relatively easy role to play, particularly when a country's leadership consists of dictators or military juntas.  However, as Islamists step out from this role two trends will emerge.  First, there will be growing divergence within the movement.  As an opposition they could remain strong and united in saying "no;" as leaders they will invariably differ in how to proceed. [This may be another explanation for why the Islamist leadership is wary about taking full control of the government - they wish to get their base in line before power splits them apart.]  Invariably such dissension will weaken the movement and undermine their ability to create serious harm.

The second trend to emerge will be that of moderation.  Those who assume leadership positions in democracies with strong non-Islamist bases will be forced to tailor their message and policy goals in order to maintain their position.  For instance, Egyptian Islamists have long disparaged the peace accord with Israel, but it seems unlikely that, once running the country, they would choose to create a new enemy on their border by repudiating the deal. Such moderation will lead to further fractionalization of the movements and more amenable rulers.

Finally, it is doubtful whether the Islamist parties, particularly in their present manifestations, will be able to maintain significant popular support to dominate their respective countries. While they have historically been the most vocal and organized critics of the Arab regimes, the Arab Spring has largely been a secular movement.  In fact, the recent revolutions largely discredit the Islamist movement, which has failed over the past decades to achieve what these secular, youth movements have achieved over the past year.  The Arab Street does not want to shift from secular dictatorships to theocratic ones.  This partially explains the moderation of the Islamist movements but will also explain the inevitable rise of more secular parties.

None of this is to say that the next few years will be a time of peace and harmony in the Middle East.  Nor is it to suggest that the West's interests will always be paramount under these new regimes - new democracies will undoubtedly be fickle.  These new countries will not be younger, carbon-copies of the West but youthful and unique states that blend democratic institutions with experiences and expectations of the Arab and Muslim world.  Many policies may be anathema to America sentiments, for instance the treatment of women.  However, it is arguable that despite what a Western would call "missteps," most new democratic regimes will not be nearly as threatening as some fear.

In a sense, the un-repression of the Islamists will be their death knell.  Their ideology will be unable to withstand the open competition natural to democracy.  The superior systems of democracy and freedom will undoubtedly win the hearts and minds of the people, as the Islamists will be forced either to moderate or splinter off into smaller groups.  While this may not happen immediately and it is quite possible to have a seriously wrong turn in the short-run, over the long-run it is relatively clear that such an ideology cannot have a long-lasting hold.  One only need to look at the current struggles in Iran (and possibly soon to be second revolution) to understand this point.

The West would be wise to co-opt this to the best of their ability.  They should facilitate the removal of the current regimes, like Syria, to not only be perceived by the Arab masses as friends of freedom but to undercut the Islamist movements.  This will not only provide greater input and sway into the new regimes, but allow more Western-friendly parties to flourish.  Additionally, the West needs to exploit the inevitable divisions within Islamist movements, cultivating the most moderate and marginalizing the extremists.  While this will not ensure an immediate win on all fronts, it will guarantee the best possible long-term outcome for both the Middle East and the West.

[For two interesting articles that expand on these arguments see "The Rise of the Islamists" by Shadi Hamid  and "Terrorism After the Revolution" by Daniel Byman both published in May/June 2011 issue of Foreign Affairs.]

The Weekend Interview with Wolfowitz

This week's Weekend Interview in the Wall Street Journal is an interesting and recommended read.  The WSJ sits down with Paul Wolfowitz, often deemed one of the architects of the Iraq War and the neocon movement.  Wolfowitz discusses his thoughts on bin Laden, the Arab Spring, Iran, and Iraq.  While at times critical of Obama - who had opposed Wolfowitz from his pre-presidential days - Wolfowitz is quite even-handed and provides insightful analysis on the Middle East.  Most interesting is that he demurs on crediting the Iraq War for sparking the Arab Spring, arguing that "I think Iraq took so long and was so bloody and is still so uncertain that it would be hard to say that it has inspired people."

Time to Support Obama

As the far-left has assumed its normal, although currently somewhat subdued, opposition to war, many Republicans have begun to position themselves against the administration’s actions in Libya. Seemingly, much of this opposition on the right comes from politically- not ideologically-motivated origins. While budgetary concerns are certainly high in the minds of many Tea Party-infused congressmen, the GOP should be careful to avoid opposing a policy just because Obama initiated it.

A number of Republicans have begun speaking out against the mission. Some of this questioning is certainly appropriate. For instance, Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) was correct to press Obama on the objectives of the mission in a recent letter sent to the president. However, like many Republicans, Boehner walks a fine line between assisting the war-wary president to define the United States’ goals and commitments and, on the other hand, fomenting an unwise charge against the intervention in Libya.

As outlined in the letter, there are a number of tactical considerations that must be publically clarified. Presumably some of Obama’s hesitation is due to the image of the anti-war president that he assiduously crafted as a candidate. But while questioning these tactical and even broader strategic concerns is valid, the underlying need and motivation for intervention should be off the table.

Not only would such partisan attacks smack of raw politics but they would establish a huge contradiction within Republican ideology. Republicans have spent over a decade defending the need to promote democracy across the globe. While there have arguably been missteps in the implementation of this mission, the underlying goal is sound. For a few partisan points in their political battle with Obama, it would be foolish to throw all of this away.

Instead, Republicans should jump on board with the no-fly zone, throwing their support behind the president and showing America that when the Democrats choose to do the right thing, bipartisanship can prevail. Not every policy initiated by the current administration need be opposed; fighting across the aisle is only warranted when the other side is grossly out of line, for instance as the Democrats were on Obamacare. Americans want to see this country moved in the right direction; they do not want to see consistent bickering.

The call, by some Republicans, including Utah’s congressmen, Jason Chaffetz, for congressional authorization of the no-fly zone is a prime example of this misguided policy. Relying upon Obama’s own asinine comments made to this effect while a candidate, Chaffetz argues that the president must turn to Congress for approval. This argument, though, is a straw-man, used by the opposition party for decades. Congress has not officially declared war since World War II, while numerous military actions have been initiated by presidents in the years since. The ability of the president, as commander-in-chief, to send troops into battle has been a long-settled issue. While Congress should undoubtedly be consulted prior to military action and should maintain certain controls and inputs into its execution, the current criticisms are nothing but transparent attacks on the office of the president.

Republicans should not join the far-left in this attack. That ground should be left to Dennis Kucinich and his loony friends who are mulling impeaching Obama. Instead, if the GOP feels the need to separate itself from the administration, it could look to some of the mistakes made in the implementation of the no-fly zone, in particular the long delay in its initiation. Jonah Goldberg, at National Review Online, makes the most poignant argument in this regard. While fully supporting the mission, he argues that the delay in getting it started has added some considerable difficulties. Goldberg blames this on Obama’s desire to be a multilateralist and fear of “too much unilateral hot-dogging” if the United States had taken the lead. His analysis is quite astute and correctly separates the tactical blunders made by the administration from the strategic necessity of intervention.

For Republicans who cut their teeth on opposition to this president, throwing their weight behind him will be a bitter pill to swallow. But doing right, by American interests, their principles, and the Libyan people, is far more important than partisan brownie points. Republicans need to show their principles and their mettle and support the president.