Equally damning is the price that Israel has agreed to pay for the return of Shalit. It will now release scores of murderers and terrorists, many of whom are sworn to Israel's destruction. At least some of them will undoubtedly commit further terrorist attacks—in all likelihood causing the deaths of more Israelis. It is impossible for the Israeli government to morally justify the release of terrorists when death for some unfortunate Israelis is the inevitable outcome. Trading one captured prisoner for potential, even if undetermined, dead is unfathomable.
Finally, as harsh as it may seem, Israel will not be getting back the national hero that Shalit has been romanticized into over the past five years. As anyone who is familiar with Stockholm Syndrome knows, five years of isolation in a Hamas prison will not have worn well on the young Shalit, who was only 19 at the time of his capture. It is highly probable that Shalit has been completely brainwashed and indoctrinated by Hamas through years of psychological and physical control and torture. In all likelihood, over the course of his imprisonment, his handlers were able to break him. A worst case scenario is that he comes out of captivity as a mouthpiece for Hamas, slamming the very Israelis who sacrificed to gain his freedom. Obviously, such an outcome would be a huge propaganda win for Hamas and a demoralizing blow for Israel. Needless to say, it would only contribute to the mounting costs of this foolish prisoner swap. 
However misguided, the venerable roots of Israel's policy should not be denied. The intention is pure—to ensure that no solider is left behind, whether alive or dead. This is at least understandable, if not in some simplistic way commendable. It is undoubtedly comforting for the soldiers of such a small state to feel protected by their government. Nevertheless, while one's heart bleeds for the tragic Shalit, the government must consider the broader picture. There are better ways to maintain a commitment for the safe return of one's soldiers. Finding alternative means to punish Hamas, deter abductions, and obtain Shalit's release are the only method to fruitfully maintain Israeli security. Prisoner swaps will only lead to further tragedies and should never be a policy option.
 This is not meant to say that Israel should not do what it can to ensure Shalit's return—it should—but simply that the benefits the Israelis will get from a swap are not only most likely lower than they expect but certainly not worth the broader costs.